Citizens’ League · Operation Citizen · Public money record

Trace one public decision from law to debt.

Use: choose a year or a supplied event. The same choice updates the two graphs, the annual figures, the event record, and each of the five decision steps.

Interactive investigation

Choose the record you want the five steps to explain.

Constitution, Article I, sections 7–9

Annual flows and the debt that remained.

Receipts and outlays are yearly flows. Debt is the accumulated obligation at the end of the fiscal year. They use separate graphs because putting them on one scale would hide the annual flows. The selected year moves on both graphs.

━━ Receipts┄┄ Outlays

━━ Gross federal debt

What this can show: when receipts, outlays, deficits, and debt changed, and which documented events belong beside those years. What it cannot show by itself: the share of the debt caused by one program. That requires the law, account, outlay, repayment, and financing record.

OMB FY2027 Table 1.1: actual receipts and outlays through FY2025 · OMB FY2027 Table 7.1: federal debt at year end

Open the complete annual table, including debt
Annual actuals, millions of nominal dollars
Fiscal yearReceiptsOutlaysSurplus / deficit (−)Gross federal debtAnnual debt changeDebt held by publicHeld by government accounts
1,980517,112590,941-73,830909,041—711,923197,118
1,981599,272678,241-78,968994,82885,787789,410205,418
1,982617,766745,743-127,9771,137,315142,487924,575212,740
1,983600,562808,364-207,8021,371,660234,3451,137,268234,392
1,984666,438851,805-185,3671,564,586192,9261,306,975257,611
1,985734,037946,344-212,3081,817,423252,8371,507,260310,163
1,986769,155990,382-221,2272,120,501303,0781,740,623379,878
1,987854,2871,004,017-149,7302,345,956225,4551,889,753456,203
1,988909,2381,064,416-155,1782,601,104255,1482,051,616549,487
1,989991,1041,143,743-152,6392,867,800266,6962,190,716677,084
1,9901,031,9581,252,993-221,0363,206,290338,4902,411,558794,733
1,9911,054,9881,324,226-269,2383,598,178391,8882,688,999909,179
1,9921,091,2081,381,529-290,3214,001,787403,6092,999,7371,002,050
1,9931,154,3341,409,386-255,0514,351,044349,2573,248,3961,102,647
1,9941,258,5661,461,752-203,1864,643,307292,2633,433,0651,210,242
1,9951,351,7901,515,742-163,9524,920,586277,2793,604,3781,316,208
1,9961,453,0531,560,484-107,4315,181,465260,8793,734,0731,447,392
1,9971,579,2321,601,116-21,8845,369,206187,7413,772,3441,596,862
1,9981,721,7281,652,45869,2705,478,189108,9833,721,0991,757,090
1,9991,827,4521,701,842125,6105,605,523127,3343,632,3631,973,160
2,0002,025,1911,788,950236,2415,628,70023,1773,409,8042,218,896
2,0011,991,0821,862,846128,2365,769,881141,1813,319,6152,450,266
2,0021,853,1362,010,894-157,7586,198,401428,5203,540,4272,657,974
2,0031,782,3142,159,899-377,5856,760,014561,6133,913,4432,846,570
2,0041,880,1142,292,841-412,7277,354,657594,6434,295,5443,059,113
2,0052,153,6112,471,957-318,3467,905,300550,6434,592,2123,313,088
2,0062,406,8692,655,050-248,1818,451,350546,0504,828,9723,622,378
2,0072,567,9852,728,686-160,7018,950,744499,3945,035,1293,915,615
2,0082,523,9912,982,544-458,5539,986,0821,035,3385,803,0504,183,032
2,0092,104,9893,517,677-1,412,68811,875,8511,889,7697,544,7074,331,144
2,0102,162,7063,457,079-1,294,37313,528,8071,652,9569,018,8824,509,926
2,0112,303,4663,603,065-1,299,59914,764,2221,235,41510,128,1874,636,035
2,0122,449,9903,526,563-1,076,57316,050,9211,286,69911,281,1314,769,790
2,0132,775,1063,454,881-679,77516,719,434668,51311,982,7134,736,721
2,0143,021,4913,506,284-484,79317,794,4831,075,04912,779,8995,014,584
2,0153,249,8903,691,850-441,96018,120,106325,62313,116,6925,003,414
2,0163,267,9653,852,615-584,65019,539,4501,419,34414,167,6245,371,826
2,0173,316,1843,981,634-665,45020,205,704666,25414,665,4395,540,265
2,0183,329,9074,108,981-779,07421,462,2771,256,57315,749,5675,712,710
2,0193,463,3644,446,952-983,58822,669,4661,207,18916,800,7005,868,766
2,0203,421,1646,516,817-3,095,65326,902,4554,232,98921,016,6695,885,786
2,0214,047,1116,820,705-2,773,59428,385,5621,483,10722,284,0406,101,522
2,0224,897,3396,271,510-1,374,17130,838,5862,453,02424,253,4456,585,141
2,0234,440,9486,128,415-1,687,46732,988,9902,150,40426,235,5926,753,398
2,0244,919,8846,735,261-1,815,37735,230,7142,241,72428,193,8667,036,848
2,0255,236,4217,011,105-1,774,68437,374,9642,144,25030,167,2247,207,740

Event records matching the controls

Who supplied the receipts?

The selection below updates the shares immediately. Individual income plus social-insurance and retirement receipts is a Treasury-category comparison, not a complete study of who ultimately bears each tax.

OMB FY2027 Table 2.1: receipts by source · CBO: tax-incidence method

Put the trust-fund balances beside the general budget.

A federal trust fund is not a segregated vault of cash. Dedicated receipts enter Treasury. Amounts not needed for current benefits or program costs are invested in special Treasury securities. The security is an asset of the trust fund and a binding obligation of Treasury. When the fund redeems it, Treasury must supply spendable cash from current receipts, additional public borrowing, or other budget adjustments.

How large are the obligations?

The table shows the principal funds used in this explanation. It does not imply that every federal trust fund has the same financing rules.

Principal federal trust-fund balances used in this explanation; billions of dollars
FundDateTreasury securities / investmentsCurrent scaleFinancing or solvency measure
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)Dec. 31, 2025$2,338.300B2025 income $1,248.8B; cost $1,448.8BFull scheduled benefits projected through Q4 2032; 78% payable then from continuing income if law does not change. Official source
Disability Insurance (DI)Dec. 31, 2025$223.000B2025 income $200.5B; cost $160.7BFull scheduled benefits projected through the 75-year period. Official source
Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI)Dec. 31, 2025$255.700B2025 income $462.4B; cost $444.2BFull scheduled benefits projected through Q2 2033; 89% payable then from continuing income if law does not change. Official source
Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI)Dec. 31, 2025$168.400B2025 income $763.8B; cost $765.8BFinanced each year by premiums and general revenues; described as adequately financed under present law. Official source
Highway Trust FundSept. 30, 2025$68.941BPlus $5.337B Fund Balance with Treasury; 2025 net excise-tax and other nonexchange revenue $47.686BDOT reports the investment and Treasury-balance components separately; this row is not a claim that all assets are spendable cash. Official source
Airport and Airway Trust FundSept. 30, 2025$18.698BPlus $1.943B Fund Balance with Treasury; FAA reports a $21.8B year-end cash balanceFAA says aviation excise taxes and interest finance the fund, subject to congressional appropriation. Official source

Why this structure matters to citizens

Citizens can face the obligation twice in different roles: first as workers or users paying a dedicated tax, and later as taxpayers and beneficiaries depending on Treasury to redeem the securities and Congress to keep the program financed. The earlier payment created a federal obligation; it was not preserved as separate cash. If dedicated income and reserves cannot cover scheduled benefits, the unresolved policy choice becomes visible: increase dedicated revenue, use general revenue or borrowing, reduce benefits, change other spending, or combine those measures.

The 2026 Trustees Report identifies an immediate payroll-tax increase or an equivalent benefit reduction as mathematical ways to close the long-range Social Security gap. Those are illustrations, not the only legislative choices and not proof that Social Security caused the general-fund deficit. The citizen question is who already paid, what obligation was created, how the cash was used, and who is asked to carry the adjustment.

What the record establishes

Trust-fund securities are federal obligations, and surplus cash was available to finance government generally or reduce borrowing from the public. The same accounting does not establish that a stated share of the debt financed capital. To make that claim, trace the separate tax, spending, rescue, subsidy, and borrowing laws rather than assigning the entire unified budget to one beneficiary.

What rescue records add

Emergency rescues can increase outlays or exposure, but authorization, disbursement, repayment, and final cost must remain separate. TARP is the clearest warning: $700 billion of initial authority was not a $700 billion permanent loss. Use the event records to test which costs remained and who received the benefit.

OMB FY2027 Table 13.1: Social Security and Medicare trust-fund cash · SSA: Social Security trust-fund accounts and investments · 2026 Social Security Trustees Report · U.S. DOT FY2025 financial report: dedicated-collection funds · FAA: Airport and Airway Trust Fund FY2025 status · GAO: TARP lifetime cost, January 2024

Open the complete Social Security cash table
Combined OASI and DI cash record, millions of nominal dollars
YearCash incomeCash outgoCash surplus / deficitReserves at year end
1,980117,439118,559-1,12032,260
1,981134,564139,584-5,02027,239
1,982148,027155,964-7,93719,302
1,983172,493172,28021331,952
1,984181,127180,86526232,214
1,985200,349190,9869,36339,753
1,986216,545199,81516,73045,870
1,987227,640208,07019,57065,440
1,988259,056220,25738,799104,239
1,989286,072233,62852,444156,684
1,990307,921249,70558,216214,900
1,991325,882272,36653,516268,415
1,992338,331287,58550,746319,161
1,993351,390304,60146,789365,949
1,994376,327319,57056,757422,706
1,995396,300335,85460,446483,152
1,996416,427350,01966,408549,562
1,997446,585365,27081,315630,878
1,998478,640379,22899,412730,293
1,999514,768390,057124,711855,004
2,000561,321409,473151,8481,006,852
2,001596,851433,874162,9771,169,829
2,002615,068456,013159,0551,328,884
2,003630,346474,680155,6661,484,548
2,004646,732495,855150,8771,635,425
2,005696,833523,298173,5351,808,960
2,006739,835554,635185,2001,994,160
2,007772,786586,162186,6242,180,784
2,008802,825617,160185,6652,366,449
2,009807,100669,778137,3222,503,771
2,010788,061706,35181,7102,585,484
2,011798,958730,94368,0152,653,499
2,012837,945773,36464,5812,718,080
2,013851,053813,43337,6202,755,698
2,014877,496850,56826,9282,782,625
2,015913,352887,76725,5852,808,210
2,016950,223916,07334,1502,842,360
2,017992,091944,90447,1872,889,545
2,018992,568987,9044,6642,894,208
2,0191,051,1201,044,6066,5142,900,721
2,0201,103,0861,095,5627,5242,908,174
2,0211,080,3051,134,687-54,3822,853,862
2,0221,203,0761,218,615-15,5392,838,320
2,0231,332,9471,354,565-21,6182,816,703
2,0241,404,3641,460,892-56,5282,760,173
2,0251,438,2041,581,790-143,5862,616,587

Turn the finding into a request.

Choose one act, account, and period. Ask for the authority, money authorized, money paid, recoveries, remaining obligation, and public result. Put the response beside the question.

PREPARE THE OVERSIGHT REQUEST KEEP THE RESULT

Source and coverage record

Official OMB FY2027 Historical Tables checked September 9, 2026. Completed annual actuals run through FY2025; FY2026 is still in progress and is not mixed with full-year actuals. This edition contains 46 fiscal-total and debt observations, 66 receipt-composition observations, 46 combined OASI/DI cash observations, and 6 event records.

Download the data and source register

Was annual funding ready?

All regular appropriations bills were enacted on or before October 1 in four of these 49 fiscal years. Continuing resolutions were enacted in 46 years, totaling 207 acts.

A CR count is not a shutdown count. FY1977 had all regular bills in place by October 1, yet two CRs funded omitted activities. The number of regular bills changed from 13 to 11 to 12; compare the denominator as well as the count.

This record runs through FY2025. It does not extend the spending actuals above beyond FY2022, measure disruption costs, or assign responsibility for delay.

Citizen check: identify the program, its funding law and expiry, and the service affected. Ask the responsible office for the documented consequence of a delay.

CRS R46595, March 27, 2025, Table 1 · Source record

Read all 49 fiscal years
Regular bills enacted on or before October 1 and CRs enacted
Fiscal yearRegular bills / totalCRs
197713 / 132
19789 / 133
19795 / 131
19803 / 132
19811 / 133
19821 / 134
19831 / 132
19844 / 132
19854 / 135
19860 / 135
19870 / 136
19880 / 135
198913 / 130
19901 / 133
19910 / 135
19923 / 134
19931 / 131
19942 / 133
199513 / 130
19960 / 1313
199713 / 130
19981 / 136
19991 / 136
20004 / 137
20012 / 1321
20020 / 138
20030 / 138
20043 / 135
20051 / 133
20062 / 113
20071 / 114
20080 / 124
20093 / 122
20101 / 122
20110 / 128
20120 / 125
20130 / 122
20140 / 124
20150 / 125
20160 / 123
20171 / 123
20180 / 125
20195 / 123
20200 / 122
20210 / 125
20220 / 124
20230 / 123
20240 / 124
20250 / 123

How long did interim funding last?

FY1998–2025: 134 interim CRs; average duration 118.18 days. Duration includes covered funding-gap intervals and can extend beyond regular-law enactment. It does not mean every program stayed under a CR throughout. Full-year CR remainders are excluded.

Calendar checks differ from published durations by one day in FY2013, 2015, 2017, 2018 and 2021. Both values are shown; the four later-year differences remain unresolved.

FY2013: Table 2 gives March 26, while Appendix A and Public Law 112-175, section 106 give March 27 as the outer date. Earlier enactment can end funding sooner. The 178-day figure matches March 27.

Read 28 years of interim funding duration
CRS Table 2: interim funding
FYInterim CRsCRS daysInclusive calendar daysFinal interim expiryFull-year CR also enacted
1998657571997-11-26No
1999621211998-10-21No
2000763631999-12-02No
20012182822000-12-21No
200281021022002-01-10No
200381431432003-02-20No
200451231232004-01-31No
2005369692004-12-08No
2006392922005-12-31No
200731381382007-02-15Yes
2008492922007-12-31No
200921621622009-03-11No
2010279792009-12-18No
201171971972011-04-15Yes
2012584842011-12-23No
201311781772013-03-26Yes
201441101102014-01-18No
201551561572015-03-06No
2016383832015-12-22No
201732162172017-05-05No
201851731742018-03-23No
201931381382019-02-15No
2020281812019-12-20No
2021588892020-12-28No
202241661662022-03-15No
2023391912022-12-30No
202441601602024-03-08No
202521651652025-03-14Yes

Finance: trace risk into public obligation

Ask who could take the risk, who was responsible for checking it, and who carried the loss when the institution could not. The savings-and-loan crisis and the 2008 crisis are separate episodes; compare their mechanisms without collapsing their costs.

Financial-sector evidence: mechanisms, disagreement and accounting
StageSource-backed recordWhat remains distinct
Savings and loans: exposure before the rescueThrifts funded long-term fixed-rate mortgages with shorter-term deposits. Rising rates damaged asset values and funding economics. Regulators allowed insolvent institutions to remain open and expanded permissible activities. A Turbulent History; written November 22, 2013The official history identifies interest-rate exposure, regulatory forbearance and broader lending powers together. Deregulation alone is an incomplete causal explanation.
Savings and loans: public resolutionFIRREA in 1989 reorganized supervision and created the Resolution Trust Corporation. RTC closed 747 thrifts with over $407 billion in assets; the Federal Reserve history cites taxpayer cost estimated as high as $124 billion. Resolution; written November 22, 2013Institution assets are not taxpayer losses. The cost is a dated historical estimate; do not combine it with assets or treat it as an estimate for the 2008 crisis.
2008 crisis: majority findingThe Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission majority identified failures in financial regulation and supervision as devastating to stability. Six commissioners adopted the report; four dissented. Printed pages viii and xviii; official edition corrected through February 25, 2011This is an attributed inquiry finding. It is not a unanimous conclusion or a judicial finding that a single law caused the crisis.
2008 crisis: competing accountHennessey, Holtz-Eakin and Thomas argued that a U.S.-regulation-centered account underweighted the global credit bubble. Their dissent emphasized global capital flows and repricing of risk. Dissent, printed pages 414–422Preserve this dispute when presenting causal conclusions. Chronology and rescue spending alone cannot resolve it.
Rescue accounting and citizen resultThe TARP panel in this companion separates $700 billion initial authority, $443.5 billion disbursements and $31.1 billion lifetime cost through September 30, 2023, as reported by GAO. Existing checked TARP record in this kitTARP is one program, not the entire crisis cost. Repayment does not measure lost homes, jobs or household wealth; those require their own evidence.

What would prove a public obligation was met?

For one intervention, identify the legal authority, recipient, instrument, conditions, oversight office and reporting date. Record money committed, money paid, recoveries and remaining exposure separately. Then ask whether the promised protection reached depositors, borrowers, workers or communities—and which evidence measures that result.

A repaid loan can coexist with severe household harm. A large authorization can coexist with a smaller net program cost. Neither observation answers the entire citizen question.

Read the case record · Prepare the evidence request · Inspect household outcomes

Retirement: who carries the risk, and what reaches the worker?

A growing retirement market does not, by itself, establish a secure retirement. Ask what was promised, who supplied the money, who carried the investment risk, and what income the worker can actually draw.

Retirement promise, participation and distribution evidence
QuestionRecordLimit
Identify the promiseA defined-benefit plan promises a benefit under a formula. A defined-contribution plan pays from an individual account whose value depends on contributions and investment gains or losses. Most traditional defined-benefit plans have PBGC protection within limits. SourceAn account-style statement alone does not identify the plan: cash-balance plans are defined-benefit plans. Check the actual plan documents.
Locate investment riskBLS explains that defined-contribution participants bear investment risk. Its December 2016 article also describes employer cost predictability and worker portability as features of these plans. SourceThis explains the mechanism; it does not prove every employer changed plans for the same reason, or that every participant lost money.
Separate participation from accessIn March 2016, 44% of private-industry workers participated in defined-contribution plans: 63% of management, professional and related workers versus 19% of service workers. SourceThese are dated participation rates, not current rates, plan access rates, retirement adequacy or shares of tax benefits.
Test the distribution claimGAO’s 2011 analysis of 2007 data found about 5% of defined-contribution participants contributed at or above statutory limits. About 72% of that group had earnings in the top tenth of participants. SourceThe denominator is plan participants, not all earners. This contribution-limit finding is separate from the tax-benefit distribution measured below.
Check the chapbook’s 2023 figureBLS reports that 15% of private-industry workers had access to a defined-benefit plan in March 2023, and 11% participated. For defined-contribution plans, the figures were 67% and 49%. SourceThese are shares of private-industry workers, not retirees. Workers can have both plan types. Neither pension access nor participation supports the chapbook’s broad 4% figure.
Use a comparable time windowBLS’s published access series shows defined-benefit access falling from 20% in March 2010 to 15% in March 2023. Defined-contribution access rose from 59% to 67% over those same dates. SourceThis is a 2010–2023 access comparison, not a verified 1980–2023 participation series. It does not identify individual employer conversions or establish a dollar amount of obligations transferred to households. The original 1980, $3–4 trillion and 93 million claims remain unverified.
Follow the tax benefitCBO’s October 2021 report, Table 2, estimates that in 2019 the highest-income fifth of households received 63% of the income-tax benefit from pensions and retirement savings accounts. The lowest two fifths received 0.7% and 3.8%. SourceThis is a 2019 income-tax estimate using a present-value method. It is not a current distribution or the payroll-tax distribution. WP-031’s top-5% wording is corrected to the top fifth; recovered WP-010 already uses the latter.
Identify the fiscal measureJCT’s December 3, 2025 report lists FY2025 estimates of $197.3 billion for defined-contribution plans, $134.7 billion for defined-benefit plans, $19.1 billion for traditional IRAs, $15.5 billion for Roth IRAs and $16.2 billion for Keogh plans. Their arithmetic sum is $382.8 billion. SourceThese are income-tax expenditure estimates, not cash disbursements. The sum is not a jointly modeled repeal estimate: interactions and behavioral responses matter. Do not apply CBO’s 2019 distribution mechanically to this different-year, different-method total.

Follow your own benefit

  1. Keep the plan description, benefit statement, contribution history, fee disclosures and any notice changing the plan. Record the dates and plan type.
  2. Separate your contributions from employer contributions. Identify the vested amount, investment change, fees and withdrawals; an increase funded by your own wages is not the same as an employer-funded gain.
  3. For a promised pension, record the benefit formula, service credit, retirement age and payment options. For an account, distinguish the current balance from any estimated monthly income and retain the estimate’s assumptions.
  4. Ask the plan administrator to explain an unexplained difference in writing. Preserve the response and the plan’s claims or review instructions. Use the action workbench to track the question and next step.

Request: “Please reconcile the benefit described in my plan documents with my current statement. Identify employee and employer contributions, vesting, fees, investment changes and any change to the benefit formula, with the effective dates and supporting records.”

This record supports a question about retirement security. It does not turn an account balance into guaranteed income or establish that one policy caused every shortfall.

Source reconciliation and open claims · Keep your evidence and request · Where the benefit stopped

How did major benefit-program outlays change?

Select a program, then use the fiscal-year and administration controls above. The chart compares its outlays with total federal spending. All points use the same 0–100% scale.

These are OMB’s program classifications. The total includes programs not shown separately and accounting offsets; do not add the four selected programs and call the result all mandatory spending. Net interest is shown separately above.

Outlays record spending in a year. They do not measure future benefit promises, the number of people served, adequacy of benefits or each household’s income. Nominal dollar changes also reflect prices; shares of total spending answer a different question.

OMB Table 8.5, FY2024 edition · Download the source record. FY1980–2022 actuals in millions of dollars; later estimates excluded. Program lines are preserved as published. Offsetting receipts appear elsewhere in the source, so these lines are not each program’s fully net fiscal cost.

Read all 43 years without the chart
Mandatory program outlays, millions of nominal dollars
FYSocial SecurityMedicareMedicaidUnemployment compensationTotal mandatory programsTotal federal outlays
1,980117,05331,01013,95716,889262,085590,941
1,981137,88137,92716,83318,319301,562678,241
1,982153,91645,31217,39122,278334,759745,743
1,983168,51351,24518,98529,568365,247808,364
1,984176,05256,00920,06117,019361,257851,805
1,985186,43264,08722,65515,844401,074946,344
1,986196,54768,44524,99516,135415,845990,382
1,987205,07273,39327,43515,475421,2451,004,017
1,988216,80876,90630,46213,641448,1951,064,416
1,989230,39582,71034,60413,940485,9301,143,743
1,990246,49595,80341,10317,128568,0681,252,993
1,991266,765102,04552,53325,112596,4991,324,226
1,992285,167116,17867,82736,999648,3821,381,529
1,993301,985127,90375,77435,461670,9191,409,386
1,994316,913141,83482,03426,440717,4801,461,752
1,995333,273156,88489,07021,305738,8471,515,742
1,996347,051171,27291,99022,583786,6981,560,484
1,997362,296187,44195,55220,595810,0951,601,116
1,998376,119190,233101,23419,586859,3451,652,458
1,999386,991187,694108,04221,356899,9741,701,842
2,000406,048194,115117,92120,742951,3751,788,950
2,001429,368214,061129,37427,9091,007,6381,862,846
2,002452,073227,699147,51250,6631,105,9952,010,894
2,003470,453245,709160,69354,4031,182,4872,159,899
2,004491,537264,890176,23142,3841,237,5312,292,841
2,005518,712294,334181,72032,3121,319,4302,471,957
2,006543,911324,879180,62531,0481,411,8232,655,050
2,007581,442370,775190,62432,4541,449,9872,728,686
2,008612,110385,817201,42642,7031,594,9032,982,544
2,009677,726425,095250,924119,1142,093,2393,517,677
2,010700,752446,477272,771157,0111,913,7193,457,079
2,011724,923479,923274,964117,2262,025,9663,603,065
2,012767,714466,018250,53490,7052,030,4503,526,563
2,013807,841491,809265,39267,2522,031,6343,454,881
2,014844,876505,303301,47242,6232,098,4613,506,284
2,015881,891539,873349,76231,5722,296,5283,691,850
2,016910,282588,361368,28032,1752,427,3273,852,615
2,017939,204591,401374,68230,4462,518,7733,981,634
2,018982,015581,848389,15728,0662,522,4364,109,047
2,0191,038,489643,876409,42127,0682,734,0984,446,960
2,0201,089,889768,924458,468471,5004,580,3336,553,621
2,0211,128,827688,826520,588390,8914,833,7286,822,470
2,0221,212,487747,195591,94933,1304,133,0616,273,324

How much of spending went to interest?

Use the fiscal-year and administration controls above to compare the same period. This view uses net budget interest. Gross Treasury interest is shown separately so the two measures are not confused.

Net interest reflects Treasury interest and the budget’s interest and investment-income offsets. Interest received by federal trust funds is part of that reconciliation. It remains a claim in the trust-fund accounts even though the unified budget treats it as an offset here.

A share of spending is not a share of national debt. The chart does not assign interest to one president, one tax law, or one crisis. Rates, the amount and timing of borrowing, and the composition of debt all matter; their separate effects are not estimated here.

Official OMB Table 3.2 · Data, offsets and source record

Same FY2024 source vintage as the main fiscal line: FY1980–2022 actuals, millions of nominal dollars. Later estimates are excluded. This is not a current-year interest ranking.

Read all 43 annual observations
Interest and total spending, FY1980–2022
Fiscal yearGross interestNet interestTotal outlaysNet interest / outlays
1,98074,80352,533590,9418.89%
1,98195,53568,766678,24110.14%
1,982117,22785,032745,74311.40%
1,983128,65389,808808,36411.11%
1,984153,866111,102851,80513.04%
1,985178,871129,478946,34413.68%
1,986190,272136,017990,38213.73%
1,987195,242138,6111,004,01713.81%
1,988214,047151,8031,064,41614.26%
1,989240,845168,9811,143,74314.77%
1,990264,691184,3471,252,99314.71%
1,991285,421194,4481,324,22614.68%
1,992292,294199,3441,381,52914.43%
1,993292,479198,7131,409,38614.10%
1,994296,253202,9321,461,75213.88%
1,995332,379232,1341,515,74215.31%
1,996343,918241,0531,560,48415.45%
1,997355,764243,9841,601,11615.24%
1,998363,759241,1181,652,45814.59%
1,999353,463229,7551,701,84213.50%
2,000361,925222,9491,788,95012.46%
2,001359,476206,1671,862,84611.07%
2,002332,537170,9492,010,8948.50%
2,003318,141153,0732,159,8997.09%
2,004321,679160,2452,292,8416.99%
2,005352,345183,9862,471,9577.44%
2,006405,866226,6032,655,0508.53%
2,007429,966237,1092,728,6868.69%
2,008451,143252,7572,982,5448.47%
2,009383,073186,9023,517,6775.31%
2,010413,934196,1943,457,0795.68%
2,011453,987229,9623,603,0656.38%
2,012359,219220,4083,526,5636.25%
2,013415,651220,8853,454,8816.39%
2,014429,538228,9563,506,2846.53%
2,015402,429223,1813,691,8506.05%
2,016429,950240,0333,852,6156.23%
2,017456,921262,5513,981,6346.59%
2,018521,553324,9754,109,0477.91%
2,019572,884375,1584,446,9608.44%
2,020522,644345,4706,553,6215.27%
2,021562,380352,3386,822,4705.16%
2,022717,568475,8876,273,3247.59%

Ask for a defined spending and interest record

Compare the industries: what did the public receive?

Use the same questions across industries, then keep the answers within the evidence. A tax preference, emergency loan, settlement and negotiated price are different public actions. They cannot be added into a single cost without reconciling their meaning and dates.

8 sectors shown; all have bounded source comparisons; full histories remain unfinished.

Industry records and citizen requests — source dates and limits retained
IndustryWhat the record establishesNext citizen request
Aviation
  • Rule change: The 1978 Airline Deregulation Act phased out federal control of domestic fares and service. Source
    Limit: This identifies the institutional change; it does not attribute every later outcome to that act.
  • Competition and consolidation: GAO’s 2026 review found short-run fare increases of 1–8% in three strong merger studies on overlapping routes. Its longer-term indicators nevertheless suggested increased competition; estimated fares including available ancillary fees were lower in 2024 than in 2007. Source
    Limit: Route-specific merger effects and broad trends answer different questions. Neither proves a universal path from consolidation to higher fares.
  • Citizen access: GAO reported average daily departures per route at nonhub airports were 19% lower in 2024 than in 2018. More than 70% of nonhub airports without EAS support experienced declines. Source
    Limit: Nonhub airports are a defined population. Workforce and operating costs also matter; this is not an isolated estimate of deregulation’s effect.
  • Public intervention: CBO reported $63 billion provided for pandemic payroll support and $59 billion distributed. The separate Section 4003 loan program authorized up to $46 billion and distributed less than $3 billion. Source
    Limit: Payroll assistance supported employee pay. The loan program also included national-security businesses. Authority, cash distributed and net cost are different measures.
  • Return and remaining exposure: Recipients of the largest payroll awards issued $15 billion in notes; more than half remained outstanding in April 2026. Public companies also issued warrants. Source
    Limit: Repayments and asset proceeds belong in a cost reconciliation. These facts do not prove that the support had no worker or public benefit.
Ask for route-level service changes and the conditions attached to public support. Record the request
Financial services
  • Savings and loans: exposure before the rescue: Thrifts funded long-term fixed-rate mortgages with shorter-term deposits. Rising rates damaged asset values and funding economics. Regulators allowed insolvent institutions to remain open and expanded permissible activities. Source
    Limit: The official history identifies interest-rate exposure, regulatory forbearance and broader lending powers together. Deregulation alone is an incomplete causal explanation.
  • Savings and loans: public resolution: FIRREA in 1989 reorganized supervision and created the Resolution Trust Corporation. RTC closed 747 thrifts with over $407 billion in assets; the Federal Reserve history cites taxpayer cost estimated as high as $124 billion. Source
    Limit: Institution assets are not taxpayer losses. The cost is a dated historical estimate; do not combine it with assets or treat it as an estimate for the 2008 crisis.
  • 2008 crisis: majority finding: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission majority identified failures in financial regulation and supervision as devastating to stability. Six commissioners adopted the report; four dissented. Source
    Limit: This is an attributed inquiry finding. It is not a unanimous conclusion or a judicial finding that a single law caused the crisis.
  • 2008 crisis: competing account: Hennessey, Holtz-Eakin and Thomas argued that a U.S.-regulation-centered account underweighted the global credit bubble. Their dissent emphasized global capital flows and repricing of risk. Source
    Limit: Preserve this dispute when presenting causal conclusions. Chronology and rescue spending alone cannot resolve it.
  • Rescue accounting and citizen result: The TARP panel in this companion separates $700 billion initial authority, $443.5 billion disbursements and $31.1 billion lifetime cost through September 30, 2023, as reported by GAO. Source
    Limit: TARP is one program, not the entire crisis cost. Repayment does not measure lost homes, jobs or household wealth; those require their own evidence.
Ask for the named rescue program, amounts disbursed, repayments and the remaining public exposure. Record the request
Electricity
  • Market design: GAO found that California’s design enabled wholesale suppliers to raise prices above competitive levels in summer 2000 and other periods. Retail price freezes and limits on long-term utility contracts contributed to that ability. Source
    Limit: GAO explicitly did not decide whether the exercise of market power violated law. Market power and an adjudicated violation are different findings.
  • Investigation and contributing conditions: FERC’s account of its March 2003 staff investigation identifies drought-reduced supply, inadequate infrastructure and flawed market design as conditions contributing to manipulation that worsened the crisis. Source
    Limit: Preserve the multiple contributing conditions. This is not evidence that every price increase was manipulation or that one factor explains the whole crisis.
  • Remedy record: FERC’s June 2020 page reports $6.3 billion in monetary settlements stemming from the crisis. Source
    Limit: This is the total reported on a dated page, not a verified current total, total crisis cost, or proof of credits received by each household.
  • Public oversight after the failure: FERC describes creation of its Office of Enforcement in 2002 and enhanced civil-penalty authority under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Its records distinguish the gaming case EL03-180, Enron investigation PA02-2 and refund case EL00-95. Source
    Limit: A new office or authority is not itself evidence that future harm was prevented. Read the applicable orders and actual compliance record.
Ask how the relevant settlement was allocated and whether it reached the customer bill. Record the request
Prescription drugs
  • Define the price comparison: RAND’s 2024 study using 2022 data found U.S. manufacturer gross prices at 2.78 times comparison-country prices across all drugs, and 4.22 times for brand-name originator drugs. Unbranded generics were generally cheaper in the U.S. Source
    Limit: These are manufacturer-price comparisons, not patient copays. WP-031’s description of 2.78 times as a brand-name result is incorrect.
  • Identify the public lever: The Inflation Reduction Act created direct Medicare negotiation for selected high-expenditure single-source drugs. CMS’s first cycle selected ten Part D drugs, with prices effective January 1, 2026. Source
    Limit: This is a defined program, not negotiating power over every medicine or every payer. The earlier noninterference framework is not a complete statement of current authority.
  • Keep estimates separate from delivery: In August 2024, CMS estimated $6 billion lower net spending if the agreed prices had applied in 2023, and projected $1.5 billion of beneficiary savings for 2026. Source
    Limit: The $6 billion is a counterfactual estimate; the $1.5 billion was a projection. Neither is a measured final 2026 savings total or an amount promised to each patient.
  • Check implementation: CMS’s 2026 proposed-rule announcement confirms that the first ten negotiated prices took effect January 1, 2026. Source
    Limit: A proposed rule is not a final rule. The announcement establishes implementation timing, not this patient’s actual cost or uninterrupted access.
Compare the same medicine, strength, supply and coverage; ask the plan to reconcile the payment change. Record the request
Retirement
  • Identify the promise: A defined-benefit plan promises a benefit under a formula. A defined-contribution plan pays from an individual account whose value depends on contributions and investment gains or losses. Most traditional defined-benefit plans have PBGC protection within limits. Source
    Limit: An account-style statement alone does not identify the plan: cash-balance plans are defined-benefit plans. Check the actual plan documents.
  • Locate investment risk: BLS explains that defined-contribution participants bear investment risk. Its December 2016 article also describes employer cost predictability and worker portability as features of these plans. Source
    Limit: This explains the mechanism; it does not prove every employer changed plans for the same reason, or that every participant lost money.
  • Separate participation from access: In March 2016, 44% of private-industry workers participated in defined-contribution plans: 63% of management, professional and related workers versus 19% of service workers. Source
    Limit: These are dated participation rates, not current rates, plan access rates, retirement adequacy or shares of tax benefits.
  • Test the distribution claim: GAO’s 2011 analysis of 2007 data found about 5% of defined-contribution participants contributed at or above statutory limits. About 72% of that group had earnings in the top tenth of participants. Source
    Limit: The denominator is plan participants, not all earners. This contribution-limit finding is separate from the tax-benefit distribution measured below.
  • Check the chapbook’s 2023 figure: BLS reports that 15% of private-industry workers had access to a defined-benefit plan in March 2023, and 11% participated. For defined-contribution plans, the figures were 67% and 49%. Source
    Limit: These are shares of private-industry workers, not retirees. Workers can have both plan types. Neither pension access nor participation supports the chapbook’s broad 4% figure.
  • Use a comparable time window: BLS’s published access series shows defined-benefit access falling from 20% in March 2010 to 15% in March 2023. Defined-contribution access rose from 59% to 67% over those same dates. Source
    Limit: This is a 2010–2023 access comparison, not a verified 1980–2023 participation series. It does not identify individual employer conversions or establish a dollar amount of obligations transferred to households. The original 1980, $3–4 trillion and 93 million claims remain unverified.
  • Follow the tax benefit: CBO’s October 2021 report, Table 2, estimates that in 2019 the highest-income fifth of households received 63% of the income-tax benefit from pensions and retirement savings accounts. The lowest two fifths received 0.7% and 3.8%. Source
    Limit: This is a 2019 income-tax estimate using a present-value method. It is not a current distribution or the payroll-tax distribution. WP-031’s top-5% wording is corrected to the top fifth; recovered WP-010 already uses the latter.
  • Identify the fiscal measure: JCT’s December 3, 2025 report lists FY2025 estimates of $197.3 billion for defined-contribution plans, $134.7 billion for defined-benefit plans, $19.1 billion for traditional IRAs, $15.5 billion for Roth IRAs and $16.2 billion for Keogh plans. Their arithmetic sum is $382.8 billion. Source
    Limit: These are income-tax expenditure estimates, not cash disbursements. The sum is not a jointly modeled repeal estimate: interactions and behavioral responses matter. Do not apply CBO’s 2019 distribution mechanically to this different-year, different-method total.
Ask the administrator to reconcile the promised benefit, contributions, vesting, fees and changes. Record the request
Trucking
  • Entry and price competition: GAO’s November 1983 testimony described the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 as easing entry, lifting restrictions and encouraging price competition. It found that service changes generally benefited small communities and shippers. Source
    Limit: This is an early historical assessment, not a finding about every community or present-day trucking service.
  • Workers and business failures: The same testimony attributed carrier failures to both the weak economy and competition. It found increased layoffs among union workers consistent with lifting entry and pricing restrictions, but the union study did not establish how many laid-off workers found other jobs. Source
    Limit: A shipper benefit and a worker loss can coexist. The record does not quantify all lifetime worker losses or verify WP-031’s $72 billion annual productivity figure.
Compare shipper service and worker outcomes separately, using dated records. Record the request
Rail
  • Industry recovery and rates: GAO’s October 2006 review found improved railroad financial health. Rates generally fell from 1985 to 2000, then rose slightly from 2001 to 2004. Competition and shipper dependence remained concerns. Source
    Limit: A national rate trend does not describe every route. GAO found its measures of captive shippers imperfect.
  • Dependence and public investment: GAO found some markets warranted further inquiry into possible excessive rates, rather than declaring abuse proved. It also described public freight investment, including $100 million Congress provided for Chicago-area rail improvements in 2005. Source
    Limit: Infrastructure investment is not automatically an emergency rescue. A claim of no rescue cycle does not establish that no public support exists.
Trace route-specific charges and the measured benefits of any public investment. Record the request
Telecommunications
  • Date the contribution factor: USAC lists Universal Service Fund contribution factors of 37.6% for January–March 2026, 37.0% for April–June, and 38.8% for July–September. The factor changes quarterly. Source
    Limit: These are not percentages of every customer’s entire internet or phone bill. The assessed revenue base matters.
  • Identify what is funded: FCC notice DA 26-546, released June 12, 2026, lists a third-quarter collection requirement of $2,003.13 million across schools and libraries, rural health care, high-cost support and Lifeline, after adjustments. Source
    Limit: This is a projected quarterly collection requirement, not proof of final spending, successful service delivery or a rescue of a failing company.
  • Trace the customer line item: The same notice states that a carrier’s federal universal-service line item may not exceed 38.8% of the interstate telecommunications charges on a customer’s bill during the third quarter of 2026. Source
    Limit: The rule is scoped to the named line item and charge base. Ask for the calculation before asserting an overcharge; an unrelated fee is not automatically a federal universal-service charge.
Ask for the quarterly factor and interstate charge base behind the federal line item; trace supported service separately. Record the request

These comparisons do not rank industries or prove one universal cause. Financial services and retirement have additional sections on this page. Every row links its primary sources and the action record.

Aviation: who keeps the freedom, and who carries the obligation?

Thom’s March 2026 WP-031 draft states:

The central finding is not that deregulation caused these crises but that industries cannot claim free-market freedoms while retaining public rescue eligibility.

Test that public-obligation argument against the actual sequence. Keep beneficial outcomes, adverse outcomes and alternative explanations in the record.

Aviation evidence trail: historical rule change and dated outcome checks
StageWhat the source establishesLimit
Rule changeThe 1978 Airline Deregulation Act phased out federal control of domestic fares and service. Source · 2006-06-09This identifies the institutional change; it does not attribute every later outcome to that act.
Competition and consolidationGAO’s 2026 review found short-run fare increases of 1–8% in three strong merger studies on overlapping routes. Its longer-term indicators nevertheless suggested increased competition; estimated fares including available ancillary fees were lower in 2024 than in 2007. Source · 2026-06-25Route-specific merger effects and broad trends answer different questions. Neither proves a universal path from consolidation to higher fares.
Citizen accessGAO reported average daily departures per route at nonhub airports were 19% lower in 2024 than in 2018. More than 70% of nonhub airports without EAS support experienced declines. Source · 2026-06-04Nonhub airports are a defined population. Workforce and operating costs also matter; this is not an isolated estimate of deregulation’s effect.
Public interventionCBO reported $63 billion provided for pandemic payroll support and $59 billion distributed. The separate Section 4003 loan program authorized up to $46 billion and distributed less than $3 billion. Source · 2026-06-25Payroll assistance supported employee pay. The loan program also included national-security businesses. Authority, cash distributed and net cost are different measures.
Return and remaining exposureRecipients of the largest payroll awards issued $15 billion in notes; more than half remained outstanding in April 2026. Public companies also issued warrants. Source · 2026-06-25Repayments and asset proceeds belong in a cost reconciliation. These facts do not prove that the support had no worker or public benefit.

What a citizen can ask

For a proposed rescue, identify the recipient, instrument, amount and public purpose. Ask which conditions protect workers, service access and the public’s financial interest; who checks compliance; and which report shows the result. For your route or airport, compare fares, fees, frequency and reliability over the same period.

The evidence supports scrutiny of the exchange between public support and public obligation. It does not establish that deregulation caused a pandemic, that every merger raised every fare, or that citizens received no benefit from payroll assistance.

Source reconciliation: WP-031’s $59 billion figure cannot serve as a verified total for all historical airline rescues. CBO’s figure here refers specifically to pandemic payroll assistance. The original draft is preserved.

Inspect the case and source reconciliation · Test household benefit · Prepare the citizen record

What does the cycle evidence establish?

A sequence of loosened rules, crisis, and rescue is a pattern to test. It does not replace the account-level causal record. Compare who received authority or cash, who repaid it, what loss remained, and which public protection changed afterward.