Follow the public money · Operation Citizen

Follow the five connected decisions.

Read all five steps

TAX: Congress sets the legal terms.

Congress has taxing power. Revenue bills begin in the House; the Senate may amend them. Inspect the enacted provision, exemptions, rates, and who bears the burden. A statutory rate is not an effective tax rate.

REVENUE: The receipt is a measured flow.

Revenue is money received during a stated period. Economic conditions, timing, enforcement, and tax law affect it. Compare actual receipts with a defined baseline before claiming that a policy raised or lost revenue.

APPROPRIATE: A law supplies spending authority.

The Constitution requires an appropriation made by law before Treasury money is drawn. Inspect the amount, purpose, duration, and conditions. Some authority is permanent; not every payment depends on a new annual bill.

SPEND: Follow authority into payment.

An appropriation and an outlay are different stages. Ask which agency incurred an obligation and when money was paid. Check the payment against the law, then check whether the promised public result occurred.

BORROW / DEBT: Financing leaves a later obligation.

Congress has borrowing power. A deficit is an annual flow; debt is a stock at a date. Do not add a stock to a year’s spending. Separate debt held by the public from claims held within government.

The fiscal line needs an event record.

Receipts and outlays, fiscal years 1980–2022. Amounts are nominal dollars: they are not adjusted for inflation or the size of the economy. These annual totals describe the result; the event records help test its causes.

━━ Receipts┄┄ Outlays

Administration contextInspect a fiscal yearEvent type

The chart stops at 2022 because later years in this source edition are estimates. They are excluded. Event markers show timing, not a calculation of each event’s share of the deficit. No total is assigned to a president.

OMB Historical Tables, FY2024 edition, Table 1.1

Read or copy the complete annual table

Annual actuals, millions of nominal dollars
Fiscal year	Receipts	Outlays	Surplus / deficit (−)
1,980	517,112	590,941	-73,830
1,981	599,272	678,241	-78,968
1,982	617,766	745,743	-127,977
1,983	600,562	808,364	-207,802
1,984	666,438	851,805	-185,367
1,985	734,037	946,344	-212,308
1,986	769,155	990,382	-221,227
1,987	854,287	1,004,017	-149,730
1,988	909,238	1,064,416	-155,178
1,989	991,104	1,143,743	-152,639
1,990	1,031,958	1,252,993	-221,036
1,991	1,054,988	1,324,226	-269,238
1,992	1,091,208	1,381,529	-290,321
1,993	1,154,334	1,409,386	-255,051
1,994	1,258,566	1,461,752	-203,186
1,995	1,351,790	1,515,742	-163,952
1,996	1,453,053	1,560,484	-107,431
1,997	1,579,232	1,601,116	-21,884
1,998	1,721,728	1,652,458	69,270
1,999	1,827,452	1,701,842	125,610
2,000	2,025,191	1,788,950	236,241
2,001	1,991,082	1,862,846	128,236
2,002	1,853,136	2,010,894	-157,758
2,003	1,782,314	2,159,899	-377,585
2,004	1,880,114	2,292,841	-412,727
2,005	2,153,611	2,471,957	-318,346
2,006	2,406,869	2,655,050	-248,181
2,007	2,567,985	2,728,686	-160,701
2,008	2,523,991	2,982,544	-458,553
2,009	2,104,989	3,517,677	-1,412,688
2,010	2,162,706	3,457,079	-1,294,373
2,011	2,303,466	3,603,065	-1,299,599
2,012	2,449,990	3,526,563	-1,076,573
2,013	2,775,106	3,454,881	-679,775
2,014	3,021,491	3,506,284	-484,793
2,015	3,249,890	3,691,850	-441,960
2,016	3,267,965	3,852,615	-584,650
2,017	3,316,184	3,981,634	-665,450
2,018	3,329,907	4,109,047	-779,140
2,019	3,463,364	4,446,960	-983,596
2,020	3,421,164	6,553,621	-3,132,457
2,021	4,047,111	6,822,470	-2,775,359
2,022	4,897,399	6,273,324	-1,375,925

Inspect the decisions beside the line.

War authority · Fiscal year 2001

2001: Congress authorizes force

Record

Public Law 107-40 authorized force against those connected to the September 11 attacks. Congress described it as specific statutory authorization under the War Powers Resolution.

How the decision works

Authority to use force and authority to pay for an operation are separate records. Follow the authorization into appropriations and actual spending.

What this does not prove

This enacted text establishes the original authorization. It does not supply a complete conflict timeline, later legal status, or a cost total. A point on the fiscal line cannot assign all spending that year to war.

Your oversight question

Which operation, legal authority, funding act, account, period, and oversight report support the spending?

Public Law 107-40: 2001 authorization for force Constitution, Article I, sections 7–9

Prepare an oversight request Record the response

War authority · Fiscal year 2003

2002: Congress authorizes force against Iraq

Record

Public Law 107-243 was approved October 16, 2002, in fiscal year 2003. It is an authorization for use of military force, a different instrument from a formal declaration of war.

How the decision works

Congress acted on authority. The later funding path must be traced through separate appropriations and expenditure records.

What this does not prove

The marker uses fiscal year 2003 because the fiscal year began October 1. This panel does not certify the authorization’s present legal status, total war cost, or duration.

Your oversight question

Ask for a reconciliation of authorized operations, appropriations, actual outlays, and continuing obligations.

Public Law 107-243: 2002 Iraq authorization Constitution, Article I, sections 7–9

Prepare an oversight request Record the response

Financial rescue · Fiscal year 2009

2008: authorize a rescue, then reconcile its cost

Record

GAO reports that TARP began with $700 billion in authority, later reduced to $475 billion. Through September 30, 2023, disbursements totaled $443.5 billion and lifetime cost was $31.1 billion after repayments and other income.

How the decision works

Authority is a ceiling, disbursement is cash put out, and lifetime cost accounts for money returned. These figures answer different questions.

What this does not prove

GAO’s program total is not the economy-wide loss from the financial crisis. The QC manuscript’s statement that taxpayers absorbed over $700 billion in TARP cannot be carried forward as a net-cost claim.

Your oversight question

Require authorization, disbursement, recoveries, remaining exposure, and public result to be reported separately.

GAO: TARP lifetime cost, January 2024

Prepare an oversight request Record the response

Tax law · Fiscal year 2018

2017: a tax-law change changes the revenue path

Record

CBO’s February 2019 explanation identifies Public Law 115-97 as a change to its fiscal projections. Its April 2018 estimate put the increase in the primary deficit at $1.843 trillion over 2018–2028.

How the decision works

The primary deficit excludes debt-service costs. A law’s estimated effect compares a policy path with a baseline; it is not the same as the observed annual deficit.

What this does not prove

This is a dated estimate, not a realized cost total. CBO also projected higher output. Later economic changes and legislation affect observed receipts. Do not infer a tax cut paid for itself merely because nominal receipts later rose.

Your oversight question

Which baseline, time window, growth assumptions, distribution table, and debt-service treatment support the claim?

CBO: 2017 tax act and projection changes, February 2019

Prepare an oversight request Record the response

Pandemic and recession · Fiscal year 2020

2020: an economic shock and legislative response

Record

CBO’s fiscal year 2020 review estimated a $3.1 trillion deficit. It linked much of the increase to the pandemic’s economic effects and legislation enacted in response; the legislative estimate was $2.3 trillion.

How the decision works

Receipts and spending can move together: economic disruption affects tax collections, while benefit programs and emergency legislation affect outlays.

What this does not prove

The chart uses OMB’s later historical actuals. The CBO review is a contemporaneous estimate. Neither attributes the entire deficit to one act or officeholder.

Your oversight question

Separate automatic program responses, new laws, administrative action, and economic changes before assigning responsibility.

CBO: fiscal year 2020 budget review OMB Historical Tables, FY2024 edition, Table 1.1

Prepare an oversight request Record the response

Appropriations · Fiscal year 2024

2024: repeated temporary funding deadlines

Record

CRS lists four continuing resolutions for FY2024: Public Laws 118-15, 118-22, 118-35, and 118-40. The later acts used different expiration dates for different groups of accounts.

How the decision works

A continuing resolution provides funding under specified terms while full-year decisions remain unresolved. Count the acts, affected accounts, and days covered.

What this does not prove

Temporary funding does not itself prove a shutdown. The FY2024 marker falls after this chart’s actual-data range. A full performance ledger must also identify final funding acts, gaps, and the disputes behind delay.

Your oversight question

When was each account funded, under which instrument, for how long, and with what operational consequence?

CRS R46595: continuing resolutions, through FY2025

Prepare an oversight request Record the response

Which receipts fund the government?

Compare the revenue categories before deciding who bears the cost. Social insurance and retirement receipts include more than a worker’s paycheck deduction. Corporate taxes can affect owners and workers. Receipt categories are not a household burden study.

Fiscal year

The bars show each category’s share of total receipts for the selected year. They do not show statutory rates, effective rates, or the share of household income paid in tax.

Test the manuscript’s cumulative comparison

Using individual income taxes plus social insurance and retirement receipts, the 1980–2022 sum is $68.826 trillion. Corporate income receipts total $7.975 trillion. That is 43 fiscal years, not five decades. For the 50 years 1973–2022, the corresponding sums are $70.539 trillion and $8.312 trillion. These are nominal-dollar sums across years.

The available QC text uses approximately $68 trillion and $8 trillion over five decades. The first pair is close to a 1980–2022 extraction, but the original calculation has not been recovered. This is a reconciliation finding, not proof of the author’s intended start date. Do not silently change the original.

For 1960, the same category ratio is 2.58 to 1; for 2022 it is 9.69 to 1. Neither establishes how much individual citizens ultimately bore. CBO’s distribution analysis uses explicit assumptions to allocate corporate-tax burdens to capital owners and workers.

OMB FY2024 Table 2.1: receipts by source CBO: Distribution of Household Income, 2018, tax-incidence method

Read the annual category table

Millions of nominal dollars; rounding can affect sums
Year	Individual	Corporate	Social insurance / retirement	Excise	Other	Total
1,960	40,715	21,494	14,683	11,676	3,923	92,492
1,961	41,338	20,954	16,439	11,860	3,796	94,388
1,962	45,571	20,523	17,046	12,534	4,001	99,676
1,963	47,588	21,579	19,804	13,194	4,395	106,560
1,964	48,697	23,493	21,963	13,731	4,731	112,613
1,965	48,792	25,461	22,242	14,570	5,753	116,817
1,966	55,446	30,073	25,546	13,062	6,708	130,835
1,967	61,526	33,971	32,619	13,719	6,987	148,822
1,968	68,726	28,665	33,923	14,079	7,580	152,973
1,969	87,249	36,678	39,015	15,222	8,718	186,882
1,970	90,412	32,829	44,362	15,705	9,499	192,807
1,971	86,230	26,785	47,325	16,614	10,185	187,139
1,972	94,737	32,166	52,574	15,477	12,355	207,309
1,973	103,246	36,153	63,115	16,260	12,026	230,799
1,974	118,952	38,620	75,071	16,844	13,737	263,224
1,975	122,386	40,621	84,534	16,551	14,998	279,090
1,976	131,603	41,409	90,769	16,963	17,317	298,060
1,977	157,626	54,892	106,485	17,548	19,008	355,559
1,978	180,988	59,952	120,967	18,376	19,278	399,561
1,979	217,841	65,677	138,939	18,745	22,101	463,302
1,980	244,069	64,600	157,803	24,329	26,311	517,112
1,981	285,917	61,137	182,720	40,839	28,659	599,272
1,982	297,744	49,207	201,498	36,311	33,006	617,766
1,983	288,938	37,022	208,994	35,300	30,309	600,562
1,984	298,415	56,893	239,376	37,361	34,392	666,438
1,985	334,531	61,331	265,163	35,992	37,020	734,037
1,986	348,959	63,143	283,901	32,919	40,233	769,155
1,987	392,557	83,926	303,318	32,457	42,029	854,287
1,988	401,181	94,508	334,335	35,227	43,987	909,238
1,989	445,690	103,291	359,416	34,386	48,321	991,104
1,990	466,884	93,507	380,047	35,345	56,174	1,031,958
1,991	467,827	98,086	396,015	42,402	50,657	1,054,988
1,992	475,964	100,270	413,688	45,569	55,717	1,091,208
1,993	509,680	117,520	428,299	48,057	50,778	1,154,334
1,994	543,055	140,385	461,475	55,225	58,427	1,258,566
1,995	590,244	157,004	484,473	57,484	62,585	1,351,790
1,996	656,417	171,824	509,414	54,014	61,384	1,453,053
1,997	737,466	182,293	539,371	56,924	63,178	1,579,232
1,998	828,586	188,677	571,831	57,673	74,961	1,721,728
1,999	879,480	184,680	611,833	70,414	81,045	1,827,452
2,000	1,004,462	207,289	652,852	68,865	91,723	2,025,191
2,001	994,339	151,075	693,967	66,232	85,469	1,991,082
2,002	858,345	148,044	700,760	66,989	78,998	1,853,136
2,003	793,699	131,778	712,978	67,524	76,335	1,782,314
2,004	808,959	189,371	733,407	69,855	78,522	1,880,114
2,005	927,222	278,282	794,125	73,094	80,888	2,153,611
2,006	1,043,908	353,915	837,821	73,961	97,264	2,406,869
2,007	1,163,472	370,243	869,607	65,069	99,594	2,567,985
2,008	1,145,747	304,346	900,155	67,334	106,409	2,523,991
2,009	915,308	138,229	890,917	62,483	98,052	2,104,989
2,010	898,549	191,437	864,814	66,909	140,997	2,162,706
2,011	1,091,473	181,085	818,792	72,381	139,735	2,303,466
2,012	1,132,206	242,289	845,314	79,061	151,120	2,449,990
2,013	1,316,405	273,506	947,820	84,007	153,368	2,775,106
2,014	1,394,568	320,731	1,023,458	93,368	189,366	3,021,491
2,015	1,540,802	343,797	1,065,257	98,279	201,755	3,249,890
2,016	1,546,075	299,571	1,115,065	95,026	212,228	3,267,965
2,017	1,587,120	297,048	1,161,897	83,823	186,296	3,316,184
2,018	1,683,538	204,733	1,170,701	94,986	175,949	3,329,907
2,019	1,717,857	230,245	1,243,113	98,914	173,235	3,463,364
2,020	1,608,663	211,845	1,309,955	86,780	203,921	3,421,164
2,021	2,044,377	371,831	1,314,088	75,274	241,541	4,047,111
2,022	2,632,146	424,865	1,483,527	87,728	269,133	4,897,399

Follow the trust-fund claim as well as the cash.

Social Security’s trust funds hold securities. Treasury receives cash and owes the securities. Follow both sides of that record.

1. Dedicated receipts

Payroll and other program income enter the trust-fund accounts.

2. Statutory trust

The accounts track income, benefits, costs, and reserves.

3. Treasury security

Income is invested in Treasury securities. The trust holds an asset; Treasury owes the obligation.

4. Treasury cash

Cash exchanged for the securities enters Treasury’s general fund. It is distinct from the security held by the trust.

5. Redemption and interest

Securities are redeemed, with interest, to meet program costs.

6. Benefit payment

Cash pays benefits and authorized administrative costs. Keep the program record beside Treasury’s financing record.

The securities are obligations of the United States. Their existence does not settle the program’s long-term financing gap. Nor does the movement of cash erase the trust’s claim. This example describes Social Security; other trust funds have their own laws.

SSA: Social Security trust-fund accounts and investments

Ask for a record that can be reconciled.

Choose one act, account, and period. Ask your member of Congress for the legal authority, money authorized, money paid, recoveries, remaining obligation, and public result. Put the office’s response beside your question.

Prepare the request Keep the result Identify the route to change

Source and coverage record

Checked September 5, 2026. Event selection follows the QC manuscript’s fiscal questions and the September 4 handoff. Primary records control the factual labels. The manuscript is preserved; the TARP cost distinction is recorded for reconciliation.

This edition contains 43 fiscal-total observations, 63 revenue-composition observations, and six event records. It does not yet complete the required fiscal history: revenue burden, deregulation-to-crisis chains, entitlement commitments, interest drivers, conflict costs and duration, the full appropriations ledger, and later annual actuals remain to be integrated. The administration filter selects overlapping fiscal years; transition years appear under both administrations. It does not attribute their totals or events to a president. These gaps are execution work, not a reason to replace the requested history with a debt counter.

Download the data and source register

How much of spending went to interest?

Use the fiscal-year and administration controls above to compare the same period. This view uses net budget interest. Gross Treasury interest is shown separately so the two measures are not confused.

Net interest reflects Treasury interest and the budget’s interest and investment-income offsets. Interest received by federal trust funds is part of that reconciliation. It remains a claim in the trust-fund accounts even though the unified budget treats it as an offset here.

A share of spending is not a share of national debt. The chart does not assign interest to one president, one tax law, or one crisis. Rates, the amount and timing of borrowing, and the composition of debt all matter; their separate effects are not estimated here.

Official OMB Table 3.2 Data, offsets and source record

Same FY2024 source vintage as the main fiscal line: FY1980–2022 actuals, millions of nominal dollars. Later estimates are excluded. This is not a current-year interest ranking.

Read all 43 annual observations

Interest and total spending, FY1980–2022
Fiscal year	Gross interest	Net interest	Total outlays	Net interest / outlays
1,980	74,803	52,533	590,941	8.89%
1,981	95,535	68,766	678,241	10.14%
1,982	117,227	85,032	745,743	11.40%
1,983	128,653	89,808	808,364	11.11%
1,984	153,866	111,102	851,805	13.04%
1,985	178,871	129,478	946,344	13.68%
1,986	190,272	136,017	990,382	13.73%
1,987	195,242	138,611	1,004,017	13.81%
1,988	214,047	151,803	1,064,416	14.26%
1,989	240,845	168,981	1,143,743	14.77%
1,990	264,691	184,347	1,252,993	14.71%
1,991	285,421	194,448	1,324,226	14.68%
1,992	292,294	199,344	1,381,529	14.43%
1,993	292,479	198,713	1,409,386	14.10%
1,994	296,253	202,932	1,461,752	13.88%
1,995	332,379	232,134	1,515,742	15.31%
1,996	343,918	241,053	1,560,484	15.45%
1,997	355,764	243,984	1,601,116	15.24%
1,998	363,759	241,118	1,652,458	14.59%
1,999	353,463	229,755	1,701,842	13.50%
2,000	361,925	222,949	1,788,950	12.46%
2,001	359,476	206,167	1,862,846	11.07%
2,002	332,537	170,949	2,010,894	8.50%
2,003	318,141	153,073	2,159,899	7.09%
2,004	321,679	160,245	2,292,841	6.99%
2,005	352,345	183,986	2,471,957	7.44%
2,006	405,866	226,603	2,655,050	8.53%
2,007	429,966	237,109	2,728,686	8.69%
2,008	451,143	252,757	2,982,544	8.47%
2,009	383,073	186,902	3,517,677	5.31%
2,010	413,934	196,194	3,457,079	5.68%
2,011	453,987	229,962	3,603,065	6.38%
2,012	359,219	220,408	3,526,563	6.25%
2,013	415,651	220,885	3,454,881	6.39%
2,014	429,538	228,956	3,506,284	6.53%
2,015	402,429	223,181	3,691,850	6.05%
2,016	429,950	240,033	3,852,615	6.23%
2,017	456,921	262,551	3,981,634	6.59%
2,018	521,553	324,975	4,109,047	7.91%
2,019	572,884	375,158	4,446,960	8.44%
2,020	522,644	345,470	6,553,621	5.27%
2,021	562,380	352,338	6,822,470	5.16%
2,022	717,568	475,887	6,273,324	7.59%

Ask for a defined spending and interest record

How did major benefit-program outlays change?

Select a program, then use the fiscal-year and administration controls above. The chart compares its outlays with total federal spending. All points use the same 0–100% scale.

Program or total

These are OMB’s program classifications. The total includes programs not shown separately and accounting offsets; do not add the four selected programs and call the result all mandatory spending. Net interest is shown separately above.

Outlays record spending in a year. They do not measure future benefit promises, the number of people served, adequacy of benefits or each household’s income. Nominal dollar changes also reflect prices; shares of total spending answer a different question.

OMB Table 8.5, FY2024 edition Download the source record. FY1980–2022 actuals in millions of dollars; later estimates excluded. Program lines are preserved as published. Offsetting receipts appear elsewhere in the source, so these lines are not each program’s fully net fiscal cost.

Read all 43 years without the chart

Mandatory program outlays, millions of nominal dollars
FY	Social Security	Medicare	Medicaid	Unemployment compensation	Total mandatory programs	Total federal outlays
1,980	117,053	31,010	13,957	16,889	262,085	590,941
1,981	137,881	37,927	16,833	18,319	301,562	678,241
1,982	153,916	45,312	17,391	22,278	334,759	745,743
1,983	168,513	51,245	18,985	29,568	365,247	808,364
1,984	176,052	56,009	20,061	17,019	361,257	851,805
1,985	186,432	64,087	22,655	15,844	401,074	946,344
1,986	196,547	68,445	24,995	16,135	415,845	990,382
1,987	205,072	73,393	27,435	15,475	421,245	1,004,017
1,988	216,808	76,906	30,462	13,641	448,195	1,064,416
1,989	230,395	82,710	34,604	13,940	485,930	1,143,743
1,990	246,495	95,803	41,103	17,128	568,068	1,252,993
1,991	266,765	102,045	52,533	25,112	596,499	1,324,226
1,992	285,167	116,178	67,827	36,999	648,382	1,381,529
1,993	301,985	127,903	75,774	35,461	670,919	1,409,386
1,994	316,913	141,834	82,034	26,440	717,480	1,461,752
1,995	333,273	156,884	89,070	21,305	738,847	1,515,742
1,996	347,051	171,272	91,990	22,583	786,698	1,560,484
1,997	362,296	187,441	95,552	20,595	810,095	1,601,116
1,998	376,119	190,233	101,234	19,586	859,345	1,652,458
1,999	386,991	187,694	108,042	21,356	899,974	1,701,842
2,000	406,048	194,115	117,921	20,742	951,375	1,788,950
2,001	429,368	214,061	129,374	27,909	1,007,638	1,862,846
2,002	452,073	227,699	147,512	50,663	1,105,995	2,010,894
2,003	470,453	245,709	160,693	54,403	1,182,487	2,159,899
2,004	491,537	264,890	176,231	42,384	1,237,531	2,292,841
2,005	518,712	294,334	181,720	32,312	1,319,430	2,471,957
2,006	543,911	324,879	180,625	31,048	1,411,823	2,655,050
2,007	581,442	370,775	190,624	32,454	1,449,987	2,728,686
2,008	612,110	385,817	201,426	42,703	1,594,903	2,982,544
2,009	677,726	425,095	250,924	119,114	2,093,239	3,517,677
2,010	700,752	446,477	272,771	157,011	1,913,719	3,457,079
2,011	724,923	479,923	274,964	117,226	2,025,966	3,603,065
2,012	767,714	466,018	250,534	90,705	2,030,450	3,526,563
2,013	807,841	491,809	265,392	67,252	2,031,634	3,454,881
2,014	844,876	505,303	301,472	42,623	2,098,461	3,506,284
2,015	881,891	539,873	349,762	31,572	2,296,528	3,691,850
2,016	910,282	588,361	368,280	32,175	2,427,327	3,852,615
2,017	939,204	591,401	374,682	30,446	2,518,773	3,981,634
2,018	982,015	581,848	389,157	28,066	2,522,436	4,109,047
2,019	1,038,489	643,876	409,421	27,068	2,734,098	4,446,960
2,020	1,089,889	768,924	458,468	471,500	4,580,333	6,553,621
2,021	1,128,827	688,826	520,588	390,891	4,833,728	6,822,470
2,022	1,212,487	747,195	591,949	33,130	4,133,061	6,273,324

Was annual funding ready?

All regular appropriations bills were enacted on or before October 1 in four of these 49 fiscal years. Continuing resolutions were enacted in 46 years, totaling 207 acts.

Fiscal year in this historical record

A CR count is not a shutdown count. FY1977 had all regular bills in place by October 1, yet two CRs funded omitted activities. The number of regular bills changed from 13 to 11 to 12; compare the denominator as well as the count.

This record runs through FY2025. It does not extend the spending actuals above beyond FY2022, measure disruption costs, or assign responsibility for delay.

Citizen check: identify the program, its funding law and expiry, and the service affected. Ask the responsible office for the documented consequence of a delay.

CRS R46595, March 27, 2025, Table 1 Source record

Read all 49 fiscal years

Regular bills enacted on or before October 1 and CRs enacted
Fiscal year	Regular bills / total	CRs
1977	13 / 13	2
1978	9 / 13	3
1979	5 / 13	1
1980	3 / 13	2
1981	1 / 13	3
1982	1 / 13	4
1983	1 / 13	2
1984	4 / 13	2
1985	4 / 13	5
1986	0 / 13	5
1987	0 / 13	6
1988	0 / 13	5
1989	13 / 13	0
1990	1 / 13	3
1991	0 / 13	5
1992	3 / 13	4
1993	1 / 13	1
1994	2 / 13	3
1995	13 / 13	0
1996	0 / 13	13
1997	13 / 13	0
1998	1 / 13	6
1999	1 / 13	6
2000	4 / 13	7
2001	2 / 13	21
2002	0 / 13	8
2003	0 / 13	8
2004	3 / 13	5
2005	1 / 13	3
2006	2 / 11	3
2007	1 / 11	4
2008	0 / 12	4
2009	3 / 12	2
2010	1 / 12	2
2011	0 / 12	8
2012	0 / 12	5
2013	0 / 12	2
2014	0 / 12	4
2015	0 / 12	5
2016	0 / 12	3
2017	1 / 12	3
2018	0 / 12	5
2019	5 / 12	3
2020	0 / 12	2
2021	0 / 12	5
2022	0 / 12	4
2023	0 / 12	3
2024	0 / 12	4
2025	0 / 12	3

How long did interim funding last?

FY1998–2025: 134 interim CRs; average duration 118.18 days. Duration includes covered funding-gap intervals and can extend beyond regular-law enactment. It does not mean every program stayed under a CR throughout. Full-year CR remainders are excluded.

Calendar checks differ from published durations by one day in FY2013, 2015, 2017, 2018 and 2021. Both values are shown. The four later differences have been traced to the appendix rows below; the source does not explain why those rows depart from its stated counting rule.

FY2013: Table 2 gives March 26, while Appendix A and Public Law 112-175, section 106 give March 27 as the outer date. Earlier enactment can end funding sooner. The 178-day figure matches March 27.

Read 28 years of interim funding duration

CRS Table 2: interim funding
FY	Interim CRs	CRS days	Inclusive calendar days	Final interim expiry	Full-year CR also enacted
1998	6	57	57	1997-11-26	No
1999	6	21	21	1998-10-21	No
2000	7	63	63	1999-12-02	No
2001	21	82	82	2000-12-21	No
2002	8	102	102	2002-01-10	No
2003	8	143	143	2003-02-20	No
2004	5	123	123	2004-01-31	No
2005	3	69	69	2004-12-08	No
2006	3	92	92	2005-12-31	No
2007	3	138	138	2007-02-15	Yes
2008	4	92	92	2007-12-31	No
2009	2	162	162	2009-03-11	No
2010	2	79	79	2009-12-18	No
2011	7	197	197	2011-04-15	Yes
2012	5	84	84	2011-12-23	No
2013	1	178	177	2013-03-26	Yes
2014	4	110	110	2014-01-18	No
2015	5	156	157	2015-03-06	No
2016	3	83	83	2015-12-22	No
2017	3	216	217	2017-05-05	No
2018	5	173	174	2018-03-23	No
2019	3	138	138	2019-02-15	No
2020	2	81	81	2019-12-20	No
2021	5	88	89	2020-12-28	No
2022	4	166	166	2022-03-15	No
2023	3	91	91	2022-12-30	No
2024	4	160	160	2024-03-08	No
2025	2	165	165	2025-03-14	Yes

Four one-day differences traced

CRS says to count each extension from the day after the previous expiry through the new expiry. Each row below is one day shorter than that rule. Adding the appendix durations reproduces each published annual total, so the difference originates in the source table.

Source durations compared with the report’s calendar rule
Fiscal year	Extension law	Previous expiry → new expiry	CRS days	Calendar days
2015	Public Law 113-202	2014-12-11 → 2014-12-13	1	2
2017	Public Law 114-254	2016-12-09 → 2017-04-28	139	140
2018	Public Law 115-123	2018-02-08 → 2018-03-23	42	43
2021	Public Law 116-246	2020-12-21 → 2020-12-28	6	7

This does not establish an extra shutdown day or determine which activities had legal funding. Use the published count when quoting CRS; use the calendar count only with its method stated. The source’s reason for the difference remains unknown.

When did funding actually lapse?

The December 18, 2025 CRS record lists 21 funding gaps, from FY1977 through the first FY2026 gap. It counts full days between the expiry of budget authority and enactment of new authority. Next-day enactments with no full gap day are excluded.

A funding gap and a shutdown are different measures. Early gaps often did not stop agency operations. Later short gaps could end before shutdown procedures were completed. These dates alone do not establish which citizen services stopped or the cost.

This is a dated historical record. It does not establish whether additional gaps occurred after December 18, 2025. The FY2026 row does not extend the spending or CR series above.

Read all 21 events

Funding gaps: full days, not inclusive shutdown headlines
FY	Last funded date	First full gap day	Full days	Gap terminated
1977	1976-09-30	1976-10-01	10	1976-10-11
1978	1977-09-30	1977-10-01	12	1977-10-13
1978	1977-10-31	1977-11-01	8	1977-11-09
1978	1977-11-30	1977-12-01	8	1977-12-09
1979	1978-09-30	1978-10-01	17	1978-10-18
1980	1979-09-30	1979-10-01	11	1979-10-12
1982	1981-11-20	1981-11-21	2	1981-11-23
1983	1982-09-30	1982-10-01	1	1982-10-02
1983	1982-12-17	1982-12-18	3	1982-12-21
1984	1983-11-10	1983-11-11	3	1983-11-14
1985	1984-09-30	1984-10-01	2	1984-10-03
1985	1984-10-03	1984-10-04	1	1984-10-05
1987	1986-10-16	1986-10-17	1	1986-10-18
1988	1987-12-18	1987-12-19	1	1987-12-20
1991	1990-10-05	1990-10-06	3	1990-10-09
1996	1995-11-13	1995-11-14	5	1995-11-19
1996	1995-12-15	1995-12-16	21	1996-01-06
2014	2013-09-30	2013-10-01	16	2013-10-17
2018	2018-01-19	2018-01-20	2	2018-01-22
2019	2018-12-21	2018-12-22	34	2019-01-25
2026	2025-09-30	2025-10-01	42	2025-11-12

Source note: the report summary prints “2015” for the FY2026 termination year. Its table gives 2025, used here.

CRS RS20348, Table 1 and counting notes Download event records

Turn the date into a citizen question

Which office or program serves you? Identify its funding account, then request its lapse plan and actual service record. Record delayed payments, appointments or decisions with dates and supporting documents. Keep the legal funding interval separate from your documented experience.

Record your evidence in the action workbench

What did the lapse do to people and services?

Use the dates above to locate the event. Then inspect evidence of effects. A delayed payment, lost output and a cancelled service are different measures.

2018–2019: delayed spending and lost output

CBO estimates published January 28, 2019
Measure	Estimate	Meaning
Delayed federal discretionary spending	$18 billion	Compensation and purchases delayed; not permanently lost GDP
Q4 2018 real GDP reduction	$3 billion	Relative to estimated no-shutdown output
Q1 2019 real GDP reduction	$8 billion	Includes estimated resumption effects
GDP not expected to be recovered	$3 billion	Part of the combined $11 billion quarterly shortfall, not additional to it

The two quarterly GDP reductions total $11 billion in 2019 dollars. The $3 billion expected to remain unrecovered is part of that total. Do not add either figure to the $18 billion of delayed spending as a combined loss. CBO reported considerable uncertainty and excluded some indirect effects. These are estimates made then, not an audited final bill.

CBO report and methods

October 2013: specific services and recovery

Selected effects in GAO’s three-department review
Program	Recorded effect	Boundary or recovery
NIH clinical-trial registry	New registrations initially stopped; a small recalled staff reopened the registry.	Does not establish that all clinical trials stopped.
NIH grant review	Review of more than 13,700 applications was rescheduled; NIH met the next January 2014 milestone.	Most current recipients could still draw funds.
DOE Environmental Management	More than 1,700 contractor employees were laid off or required to take leave after stop-work orders.	Contract activity generally continued using multiyear funding; some programs reported four months to recover.
Merchant Marine Academy	Closure required an academic-calendar change to allow eligible students to graduate on time.	Longer-term effects cannot readily be separated from other budget events.

GAO’s recommendation to document lessons learned was marked implemented after OMB revised Circular A-11 in June 2015. That is documented procedural follow-through; it does not prove later harms were prevented.

GAO-15-86 findings and recommendation status Evidence record

Your action record

Name the service and the affected person or group. Record the expected date, actual date, notice received, documented expense and requested remedy. Separate your experience from a national estimate. Ask what changed after the service resumed and what record proves it.

Prepare an action and follow-through record

Aviation: who keeps the freedom, and who carries the obligation?

The March 2026 WP-031 draft states:

The central finding is not that deregulation caused these crises but that industries cannot claim free-market freedoms while retaining public rescue eligibility.

Test that public-obligation argument against the actual sequence. Keep beneficial outcomes, adverse outcomes and alternative explanations in the record.

Aviation evidence trail: historical rule change and dated outcome checks
Stage	What the source establishes	Limit
Rule change	The 1978 Airline Deregulation Act phased out federal control of domestic fares and service. Source · 2006-06-09	This identifies the institutional change; it does not attribute every later outcome to that act.
Competition and consolidation	GAO’s 2026 review found short-run fare increases of 1–8% in three strong merger studies on overlapping routes. Its longer-term indicators nevertheless suggested increased competition; estimated fares including available ancillary fees were lower in 2024 than in 2007. Source · 2026-06-25	Route-specific merger effects and broad trends answer different questions. Neither proves a universal path from consolidation to higher fares.
Citizen access	GAO reported average daily departures per route at nonhub airports were 19% lower in 2024 than in 2018. More than 70% of nonhub airports without EAS support experienced declines. Source · 2026-06-04	Nonhub airports are a defined population. Workforce and operating costs also matter; this is not an isolated estimate of deregulation’s effect.
Public intervention	CBO reported $63 billion provided for pandemic payroll support and $59 billion distributed. The separate Section 4003 loan program authorized up to $46 billion and distributed less than $3 billion. Source · 2026-06-25	Payroll assistance supported employee pay. The loan program also included national-security businesses. Authority, cash distributed and net cost are different measures.
Return and remaining exposure	Recipients of the largest payroll awards issued $15 billion in notes; more than half remained outstanding in April 2026. Public companies also issued warrants. Source · 2026-06-25	Repayments and asset proceeds belong in a cost reconciliation. These facts do not prove that the support had no worker or public benefit.

What a citizen can ask

For a proposed rescue, identify the recipient, instrument, amount and public purpose. Ask which conditions protect workers, service access and the public’s financial interest; who checks compliance; and which report shows the result. For your route or airport, compare fares, fees, frequency and reliability over the same period.

The evidence supports scrutiny of the exchange between public support and public obligation. It does not establish that deregulation caused a pandemic, that every merger raised every fare, or that citizens received no benefit from payroll assistance.

Source reconciliation: WP-031’s $59 billion figure cannot serve as a verified total for all historical airline rescues. CBO’s figure here refers specifically to pandemic payroll assistance. The original draft is preserved.

Inspect the case and source reconciliation Test household benefit Prepare the citizen record

Finance: trace risk into public obligation

Ask who could take the risk, who was responsible for checking it, and who carried the loss when the institution could not. The savings-and-loan crisis and the 2008 crisis are separate episodes; compare their mechanisms without collapsing their costs.

Financial-sector evidence: mechanisms, disagreement and accounting
Stage	Source-backed record	What remains distinct
Savings and loans: exposure before the rescue	Thrifts funded long-term fixed-rate mortgages with shorter-term deposits. Rising rates damaged asset values and funding economics. Regulators allowed insolvent institutions to remain open and expanded permissible activities. A Turbulent History; written November 22, 2013	The official history identifies interest-rate exposure, regulatory forbearance and broader lending powers together. Deregulation alone is an incomplete causal explanation.
Savings and loans: public resolution	FIRREA in 1989 reorganized supervision and created the Resolution Trust Corporation. RTC closed 747 thrifts with over $407 billion in assets; the Federal Reserve history cites taxpayer cost estimated as high as $124 billion. Resolution; written November 22, 2013	Institution assets are not taxpayer losses. The cost is a dated historical estimate; do not combine it with assets or treat it as an estimate for the 2008 crisis.
2008 crisis: majority finding	The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission majority identified failures in financial regulation and supervision as devastating to stability. Six commissioners adopted the report; four dissented. Printed pages viii and xviii; official edition corrected through February 25, 2011	This is an attributed inquiry finding. It is not a unanimous conclusion or a judicial finding that a single law caused the crisis.
2008 crisis: competing account	Hennessey, Holtz-Eakin and Thomas argued that a U.S.-regulation-centered account underweighted the global credit bubble. Their dissent emphasized global capital flows and repricing of risk. Dissent, printed pages 414–422	Preserve this dispute when presenting causal conclusions. Chronology and rescue spending alone cannot resolve it.
Rescue accounting and citizen result	The TARP panel in this companion separates $700 billion initial authority, $443.5 billion disbursements and $31.1 billion lifetime cost through September 30, 2023, as reported by GAO. Existing checked TARP record in this kit	TARP is one program, not the entire crisis cost. Repayment does not measure lost homes, jobs or household wealth; those require their own evidence.

What would prove a public obligation was met?

For one intervention, identify the legal authority, recipient, instrument, conditions, oversight office and reporting date. Record money committed, money paid, recoveries and remaining exposure separately. Then ask whether the promised protection reached depositors, borrowers, workers or communities—and which evidence measures that result.

A repaid loan can coexist with severe household harm. A large authorization can coexist with a smaller net program cost. Neither observation answers the entire citizen question.

Read the case record Prepare the evidence request Inspect household outcomes

Electricity: follow the charge through the remedy

A ratepayer sees the bill. The underlying record may involve a wholesale market, a utility’s contracts, a state rate decision and a federal refund order. Identify each stage before assigning a charge or a remedy to one office.

California and the Western energy crisis: findings and remedies
Stage	What the source establishes	Boundary
Market design	GAO found that California’s design enabled wholesale suppliers to raise prices above competitive levels in summer 2000 and other periods. Retail price freezes and limits on long-term utility contracts contributed to that ability. GAO-02-828, June 21, 2002; released July 17	GAO explicitly did not decide whether the exercise of market power violated law. Market power and an adjudicated violation are different findings.
Investigation and contributing conditions	FERC’s account of its March 2003 staff investigation identifies drought-reduced supply, inadequate infrastructure and flawed market design as conditions contributing to manipulation that worsened the crisis. Agency retrospective, last updated June 8, 2020	Preserve the multiple contributing conditions. This is not evidence that every price increase was manipulation or that one factor explains the whole crisis.
Remedy record	FERC’s June 2020 page reports $6.3 billion in monetary settlements stemming from the crisis. Western Energy Crisis Settlements	This is the total reported on a dated page, not a verified current total, total crisis cost, or proof of credits received by each household.
Public oversight after the failure	FERC describes creation of its Office of Enforcement in 2002 and enhanced civil-penalty authority under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Its records distinguish the gaming case EL03-180, Enron investigation PA02-2 and refund case EL00-95. Chronology and case directory	A new office or authority is not itself evidence that future harm was prevented. Read the applicable orders and actual compliance record.

The citizen’s next question

If a supplier paid a settlement, what portion reached your utility? What order determined its treatment? Was it credited to customer bills, and over which period? Ask for the settlement allocation, utility accounting and customer-credit schedule. Keep copies of the bills that show the result.

The source draft’s broader cost figures still need reconciliation. A settlement total cannot stand in for total extraction, total crisis cost or the amount returned to citizens.

Inspect the source reconciliation Record the charge, request and response

Prescription drugs: did the price change reach the patient?

A manufacturer price, a negotiated Medicare price and your pharmacy payment are different points in the transaction. Follow the same medicine, strength, quantity, coverage and date before comparing them.

Drug-price evidence and public action
Stage	Record	Limit
Define the price comparison	RAND’s 2024 study using 2022 data found U.S. manufacturer gross prices at 2.78 times comparison-country prices across all drugs, and 4.22 times for brand-name originator drugs. Unbranded generics were generally cheaper in the U.S. Source	These are manufacturer-price comparisons, not patient copays. WP-031’s description of 2.78 times as a brand-name result is incorrect.
Identify the public lever	The Inflation Reduction Act created direct Medicare negotiation for selected high-expenditure single-source drugs. CMS’s first cycle selected ten Part D drugs, with prices effective January 1, 2026. Source	This is a defined program, not negotiating power over every medicine or every payer. The earlier noninterference framework is not a complete statement of current authority.
Keep estimates separate from delivery	In August 2024, CMS estimated $6 billion lower net spending if the agreed prices had applied in 2023, and projected $1.5 billion of beneficiary savings for 2026. Source	The $6 billion is a counterfactual estimate; the $1.5 billion was a projection. Neither is a measured final 2026 savings total or an amount promised to each patient.
Check implementation	CMS’s 2026 proposed-rule announcement confirms that the first ten negotiated prices took effect January 1, 2026. Source	A proposed rule is not a final rule. The announcement establishes implementation timing, not this patient’s actual cost or uninterrupted access.

Make the benefit visible

Keep the prescription, dated pharmacy receipts, plan explanation of benefits and any coverage notice. Record the same supply before and after the change. Ask the plan to explain differences in deductible, copay, coinsurance and coverage. Record access problems separately from price changes. This worksheet does not advise changing treatment.

The international price gap raises a public-policy question; it does not by itself prove that a particular patent, public research grant or pricing clause caused the entire gap.

Source reconciliation Household benefit comparison Record your evidence and request

Retirement: who carries the risk, and what reaches the worker?

A growing retirement market does not, by itself, establish a secure retirement. Ask what was promised, who supplied the money, who carried the investment risk, and what income the worker can actually draw.

Retirement promise, participation and distribution evidence
Question	Record	Limit
Identify the promise	A defined-benefit plan promises a benefit under a formula. A defined-contribution plan pays from an individual account whose value depends on contributions and investment gains or losses. Most traditional defined-benefit plans have PBGC protection within limits. Source	An account-style statement alone does not identify the plan: cash-balance plans are defined-benefit plans. Check the actual plan documents.
Locate investment risk	BLS explains that defined-contribution participants bear investment risk. Its December 2016 article also describes employer cost predictability and worker portability as features of these plans. Source	This explains the mechanism; it does not prove every employer changed plans for the same reason, or that every participant lost money.
Separate participation from access	In March 2016, 44% of private-industry workers participated in defined-contribution plans: 63% of management, professional and related workers versus 19% of service workers. Source	These are dated participation rates, not current rates, plan access rates, retirement adequacy or shares of tax benefits.
Test the distribution claim	GAO’s 2011 analysis of 2007 data found about 5% of defined-contribution participants contributed at or above statutory limits. About 72% of that group had earnings in the top tenth of participants. Source	The denominator is plan participants, not all earners. This contribution-limit finding is separate from the tax-benefit distribution measured below.
Check the chapbook’s 2023 figure	BLS reports that 15% of private-industry workers had access to a defined-benefit plan in March 2023, and 11% participated. For defined-contribution plans, the figures were 67% and 49%. Source	These are shares of private-industry workers, not retirees. Workers can have both plan types. Neither pension access nor participation supports the chapbook’s broad 4% figure.
Use a comparable time window	BLS’s published access series shows defined-benefit access falling from 20% in March 2010 to 15% in March 2023. Defined-contribution access rose from 59% to 67% over those same dates. Source	This is a 2010–2023 access comparison, not a verified 1980–2023 participation series. It does not identify individual employer conversions or establish a dollar amount of obligations transferred to households. The original 1980, $3–4 trillion and 93 million claims remain unverified.
Follow the tax benefit	CBO’s October 2021 report, Table 2, estimates that in 2019 the highest-income fifth of households received 63% of the income-tax benefit from pensions and retirement savings accounts. The lowest two fifths received 0.7% and 3.8%. Source	This is a 2019 income-tax estimate using a present-value method. It is not a current distribution or the payroll-tax distribution. WP-031’s top-5% wording is corrected to the top fifth; recovered WP-010 already uses the latter.
Identify the fiscal measure	JCT’s December 3, 2025 report lists FY2025 estimates of $197.3 billion for defined-contribution plans, $134.7 billion for defined-benefit plans, $19.1 billion for traditional IRAs, $15.5 billion for Roth IRAs and $16.2 billion for Keogh plans. Their arithmetic sum is $382.8 billion. Source	These are income-tax expenditure estimates, not cash disbursements. The sum is not a jointly modeled repeal estimate: interactions and behavioral responses matter. Do not apply CBO’s 2019 distribution mechanically to this different-year, different-method total.

Follow your own benefit

Keep the plan description, benefit statement, contribution history, fee disclosures and any notice changing the plan. Record the dates and plan type.
Separate your contributions from employer contributions. Identify the vested amount, investment change, fees and withdrawals; an increase funded by your own wages is not the same as an employer-funded gain.
For a promised pension, record the benefit formula, service credit, retirement age and payment options. For an account, distinguish the current balance from any estimated monthly income and retain the estimate’s assumptions.
Ask the plan administrator to explain an unexplained difference in writing. Preserve the response and the plan’s claims or review instructions. Use the action workbench to track the question and next step.

Request: “Please reconcile the benefit described in my plan documents with my current statement. Identify employee and employer contributions, vesting, fees, investment changes and any change to the benefit formula, with the effective dates and supporting records.”

This record supports a question about retirement security. It does not turn an account balance into guaranteed income or establish that one policy caused every shortfall.

Source reconciliation and open claims Keep your evidence and request Where the benefit stopped

Trucking: cheaper service and worker security

Historical freight evidence and its limits
Question	Record	Limit
Entry and price competition	GAO’s November 1983 testimony described the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 as easing entry, lifting restrictions and encouraging price competition. It found that service changes generally benefited small communities and shippers. Source	This is an early historical assessment, not a finding about every community or present-day trucking service.
Workers and business failures	The same testimony attributed carrier failures to both the weak economy and competition. It found increased layoffs among union workers consistent with lifting entry and pricing restrictions, but the union study did not establish how many laid-off workers found other jobs. Source	A shipper benefit and a worker loss can coexist. The record does not quantify all lifetime worker losses or verify WP-031’s $72 billion annual productivity figure.

Make the public result visible

For a shipment, compare the same route, load, delivery promise and total charge. For a workforce change, keep wage, hours, benefits, layoff dates and subsequent employment separate from carrier savings. Ask the relevant employer or carrier to reconcile the claimed benefit with the dated record.

Record your evidence and request Read the source reconciliation

Rail: industry recovery and the dependent shipper

Historical freight evidence and its limits
Question	Record	Limit
Industry recovery and rates	GAO’s October 2006 review found improved railroad financial health. Rates generally fell from 1985 to 2000, then rose slightly from 2001 to 2004. Competition and shipper dependence remained concerns. Source	A national rate trend does not describe every route. GAO found its measures of captive shippers imperfect.
Dependence and public investment	GAO found some markets warranted further inquiry into possible excessive rates, rather than declaring abuse proved. It also described public freight investment, including $100 million Congress provided for Chicago-area rail improvements in 2005. Source	Infrastructure investment is not automatically an emergency rescue. A claim of no rescue cycle does not establish that no public support exists.

Make the public result visible

Identify the route, commodity, volume, competing transport options, full charges and service failures. For a publicly funded project, ask the sponsoring public office for the award conditions, promised public benefits and measured results. A rate complaint requires checking current eligibility and procedure; this historical comparison does not establish either.

Record your evidence and request Read the source reconciliation

Telecommunications: follow the support to the service

A public contribution and a working connection are separate facts. Ask what the charge funds, which service was promised, and what people actually received.

Universal-service funding and billing — checked September 5, 2026
Question	Record	Limit
Date the contribution factor	USAC lists Universal Service Fund contribution factors of 37.6% for January–March 2026, 37.0% for April–June, and 38.8% for July–September. The factor changes quarterly. Source	These are not percentages of every customer’s entire internet or phone bill. The assessed revenue base matters.
Identify what is funded	FCC notice DA 26-546, released June 12, 2026, lists a third-quarter collection requirement of $2,003.13 million across schools and libraries, rural health care, high-cost support and Lifeline, after adjustments. Source	This is a projected quarterly collection requirement, not proof of final spending, successful service delivery or a rescue of a failing company.
Trace the customer line item	The same notice states that a carrier’s federal universal-service line item may not exceed 38.8% of the interstate telecommunications charges on a customer’s bill during the third quarter of 2026. Source	The rule is scoped to the named line item and charge base. Ask for the calculation before asserting an overcharge; an unrelated fee is not automatically a federal universal-service charge.

Make the charge explainable

Keep the dated bill and service agreement. Identify the exact federal universal-service line item and ask the provider to show the interstate charge base and quarterly factor used. Record other fees separately. For a publicly supported connection, ask the awarding office or program administrator for the award conditions, required service, completion record and reported results.

Keep outage dates, service tickets and any credit with the promise being tested. These records can establish a specific service problem; they do not by themselves prove that consolidation or deregulation caused it.

Record the request and response Readable source reconciliation

Compare the industries: what did the public receive?

Use the same questions across industries, then keep the answers within the evidence. A tax preference, emergency loan, settlement and negotiated price are different public actions. They cannot be added into a single cost without reconciling their meaning and dates.

Choose an industry

8 sectors shown; all have bounded source comparisons; full histories remain unfinished.

Industry records and citizen requests — source dates and limits retained
Industry	What the record establishes	Next citizen request
Aviation	Rule change: The 1978 Airline Deregulation Act phased out federal control of domestic fares and service. Source Limit: This identifies the institutional change; it does not attribute every later outcome to that act. Competition and consolidation: GAO’s 2026 review found short-run fare increases of 1–8% in three strong merger studies on overlapping routes. Its longer-term indicators nevertheless suggested increased competition; estimated fares including available ancillary fees were lower in 2024 than in 2007. Source Limit: Route-specific merger effects and broad trends answer different questions. Neither proves a universal path from consolidation to higher fares. Citizen access: GAO reported average daily departures per route at nonhub airports were 19% lower in 2024 than in 2018. More than 70% of nonhub airports without EAS support experienced declines. Source Limit: Nonhub airports are a defined population. Workforce and operating costs also matter; this is not an isolated estimate of deregulation’s effect. Public intervention: CBO reported $63 billion provided for pandemic payroll support and $59 billion distributed. The separate Section 4003 loan program authorized up to $46 billion and distributed less than $3 billion. Source Limit: Payroll assistance supported employee pay. The loan program also included national-security businesses. Authority, cash distributed and net cost are different measures. Return and remaining exposure: Recipients of the largest payroll awards issued $15 billion in notes; more than half remained outstanding in April 2026. Public companies also issued warrants. Source Limit: Repayments and asset proceeds belong in a cost reconciliation. These facts do not prove that the support had no worker or public benefit.	Ask for route-level service changes and the conditions attached to public support. Record the request
Financial services	Savings and loans: exposure before the rescue: Thrifts funded long-term fixed-rate mortgages with shorter-term deposits. Rising rates damaged asset values and funding economics. Regulators allowed insolvent institutions to remain open and expanded permissible activities. Source Limit: The official history identifies interest-rate exposure, regulatory forbearance and broader lending powers together. Deregulation alone is an incomplete causal explanation. Savings and loans: public resolution: FIRREA in 1989 reorganized supervision and created the Resolution Trust Corporation. RTC closed 747 thrifts with over $407 billion in assets; the Federal Reserve history cites taxpayer cost estimated as high as $124 billion. Source Limit: Institution assets are not taxpayer losses. The cost is a dated historical estimate; do not combine it with assets or treat it as an estimate for the 2008 crisis. 2008 crisis: majority finding: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission majority identified failures in financial regulation and supervision as devastating to stability. Six commissioners adopted the report; four dissented. Source Limit: This is an attributed inquiry finding. It is not a unanimous conclusion or a judicial finding that a single law caused the crisis. 2008 crisis: competing account: Hennessey, Holtz-Eakin and Thomas argued that a U.S.-regulation-centered account underweighted the global credit bubble. Their dissent emphasized global capital flows and repricing of risk. Source Limit: Preserve this dispute when presenting causal conclusions. Chronology and rescue spending alone cannot resolve it. Rescue accounting and citizen result: The TARP panel in this companion separates $700 billion initial authority, $443.5 billion disbursements and $31.1 billion lifetime cost through September 30, 2023, as reported by GAO. Source Limit: TARP is one program, not the entire crisis cost. Repayment does not measure lost homes, jobs or household wealth; those require their own evidence.	Ask for the named rescue program, amounts disbursed, repayments and the remaining public exposure. Record the request
Electricity	Market design: GAO found that California’s design enabled wholesale suppliers to raise prices above competitive levels in summer 2000 and other periods. Retail price freezes and limits on long-term utility contracts contributed to that ability. Source Limit: GAO explicitly did not decide whether the exercise of market power violated law. Market power and an adjudicated violation are different findings. Investigation and contributing conditions: FERC’s account of its March 2003 staff investigation identifies drought-reduced supply, inadequate infrastructure and flawed market design as conditions contributing to manipulation that worsened the crisis. Source Limit: Preserve the multiple contributing conditions. This is not evidence that every price increase was manipulation or that one factor explains the whole crisis. Remedy record: FERC’s June 2020 page reports $6.3 billion in monetary settlements stemming from the crisis. Source Limit: This is the total reported on a dated page, not a verified current total, total crisis cost, or proof of credits received by each household. Public oversight after the failure: FERC describes creation of its Office of Enforcement in 2002 and enhanced civil-penalty authority under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Its records distinguish the gaming case EL03-180, Enron investigation PA02-2 and refund case EL00-95. Source Limit: A new office or authority is not itself evidence that future harm was prevented. Read the applicable orders and actual compliance record.	Ask how the relevant settlement was allocated and whether it reached the customer bill. Record the request
Prescription drugs	Define the price comparison: RAND’s 2024 study using 2022 data found U.S. manufacturer gross prices at 2.78 times comparison-country prices across all drugs, and 4.22 times for brand-name originator drugs. Unbranded generics were generally cheaper in the U.S. Source Limit: These are manufacturer-price comparisons, not patient copays. WP-031’s description of 2.78 times as a brand-name result is incorrect. Identify the public lever: The Inflation Reduction Act created direct Medicare negotiation for selected high-expenditure single-source drugs. CMS’s first cycle selected ten Part D drugs, with prices effective January 1, 2026. Source Limit: This is a defined program, not negotiating power over every medicine or every payer. The earlier noninterference framework is not a complete statement of current authority. Keep estimates separate from delivery: In August 2024, CMS estimated $6 billion lower net spending if the agreed prices had applied in 2023, and projected $1.5 billion of beneficiary savings for 2026. Source Limit: The $6 billion is a counterfactual estimate; the $1.5 billion was a projection. Neither is a measured final 2026 savings total or an amount promised to each patient. Check implementation: CMS’s 2026 proposed-rule announcement confirms that the first ten negotiated prices took effect January 1, 2026. Source Limit: A proposed rule is not a final rule. The announcement establishes implementation timing, not this patient’s actual cost or uninterrupted access.	Compare the same medicine, strength, supply and coverage; ask the plan to reconcile the payment change. Record the request
Retirement	Identify the promise: A defined-benefit plan promises a benefit under a formula. A defined-contribution plan pays from an individual account whose value depends on contributions and investment gains or losses. Most traditional defined-benefit plans have PBGC protection within limits. Source Limit: An account-style statement alone does not identify the plan: cash-balance plans are defined-benefit plans. Check the actual plan documents. Locate investment risk: BLS explains that defined-contribution participants bear investment risk. Its December 2016 article also describes employer cost predictability and worker portability as features of these plans. Source Limit: This explains the mechanism; it does not prove every employer changed plans for the same reason, or that every participant lost money. Separate participation from access: In March 2016, 44% of private-industry workers participated in defined-contribution plans: 63% of management, professional and related workers versus 19% of service workers. Source Limit: These are dated participation rates, not current rates, plan access rates, retirement adequacy or shares of tax benefits. Test the distribution claim: GAO’s 2011 analysis of 2007 data found about 5% of defined-contribution participants contributed at or above statutory limits. About 72% of that group had earnings in the top tenth of participants. Source Limit: The denominator is plan participants, not all earners. This contribution-limit finding is separate from the tax-benefit distribution measured below. Check the chapbook’s 2023 figure: BLS reports that 15% of private-industry workers had access to a defined-benefit plan in March 2023, and 11% participated. For defined-contribution plans, the figures were 67% and 49%. Source Limit: These are shares of private-industry workers, not retirees. Workers can have both plan types. Neither pension access nor participation supports the chapbook’s broad 4% figure. Use a comparable time window: BLS’s published access series shows defined-benefit access falling from 20% in March 2010 to 15% in March 2023. Defined-contribution access rose from 59% to 67% over those same dates. Source Limit: This is a 2010–2023 access comparison, not a verified 1980–2023 participation series. It does not identify individual employer conversions or establish a dollar amount of obligations transferred to households. The original 1980, $3–4 trillion and 93 million claims remain unverified. Follow the tax benefit: CBO’s October 2021 report, Table 2, estimates that in 2019 the highest-income fifth of households received 63% of the income-tax benefit from pensions and retirement savings accounts. The lowest two fifths received 0.7% and 3.8%. Source Limit: This is a 2019 income-tax estimate using a present-value method. It is not a current distribution or the payroll-tax distribution. WP-031’s top-5% wording is corrected to the top fifth; recovered WP-010 already uses the latter. Identify the fiscal measure: JCT’s December 3, 2025 report lists FY2025 estimates of $197.3 billion for defined-contribution plans, $134.7 billion for defined-benefit plans, $19.1 billion for traditional IRAs, $15.5 billion for Roth IRAs and $16.2 billion for Keogh plans. Their arithmetic sum is $382.8 billion. Source Limit: These are income-tax expenditure estimates, not cash disbursements. The sum is not a jointly modeled repeal estimate: interactions and behavioral responses matter. Do not apply CBO’s 2019 distribution mechanically to this different-year, different-method total.	Ask the administrator to reconcile the promised benefit, contributions, vesting, fees and changes. Record the request
Trucking	Entry and price competition: GAO’s November 1983 testimony described the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 as easing entry, lifting restrictions and encouraging price competition. It found that service changes generally benefited small communities and shippers. Source Limit: This is an early historical assessment, not a finding about every community or present-day trucking service. Workers and business failures: The same testimony attributed carrier failures to both the weak economy and competition. It found increased layoffs among union workers consistent with lifting entry and pricing restrictions, but the union study did not establish how many laid-off workers found other jobs. Source Limit: A shipper benefit and a worker loss can coexist. The record does not quantify all lifetime worker losses or verify WP-031’s $72 billion annual productivity figure.	Compare shipper service and worker outcomes separately, using dated records. Record the request
Rail	Industry recovery and rates: GAO’s October 2006 review found improved railroad financial health. Rates generally fell from 1985 to 2000, then rose slightly from 2001 to 2004. Competition and shipper dependence remained concerns. Source Limit: A national rate trend does not describe every route. GAO found its measures of captive shippers imperfect. Dependence and public investment: GAO found some markets warranted further inquiry into possible excessive rates, rather than declaring abuse proved. It also described public freight investment, including $100 million Congress provided for Chicago-area rail improvements in 2005. Source Limit: Infrastructure investment is not automatically an emergency rescue. A claim of no rescue cycle does not establish that no public support exists.	Trace route-specific charges and the measured benefits of any public investment. Record the request
Telecommunications	Date the contribution factor: USAC lists Universal Service Fund contribution factors of 37.6% for January–March 2026, 37.0% for April–June, and 38.8% for July–September. The factor changes quarterly. Source Limit: These are not percentages of every customer’s entire internet or phone bill. The assessed revenue base matters. Identify what is funded: FCC notice DA 26-546, released June 12, 2026, lists a third-quarter collection requirement of $2,003.13 million across schools and libraries, rural health care, high-cost support and Lifeline, after adjustments. Source Limit: This is a projected quarterly collection requirement, not proof of final spending, successful service delivery or a rescue of a failing company. Trace the customer line item: The same notice states that a carrier’s federal universal-service line item may not exceed 38.8% of the interstate telecommunications charges on a customer’s bill during the third quarter of 2026. Source Limit: The rule is scoped to the named line item and charge base. Ask for the calculation before asserting an overcharge; an unrelated fee is not automatically a federal universal-service charge.	Ask for the quarterly factor and interstate charge base behind the federal line item; trace supported service separately. Record the request

These comparisons do not rank industries or prove one universal cause. Follow the industry link for its fuller explanation and keep a response, receipt or result with your action record.

What does the cycle evidence establish?

The recovered deregulation research asks who retains access to a public rescue after market rules are loosened. A sequence of events is a starting point for that inquiry. It does not, by itself, prove what caused a crisis.

Keep support authorized, money disbursed, peak exposure, repayments, and final cost separate. A promise to lend and a dollar permanently lost are different measures. Some programs overlap; adding them without reconciliation can count the same support twice.

. The broader sector-by-sector cycle and causal evidence remain to be integrated.

What did the laws deliver?

Read the legislative appendix and checked findings: public promises, household results, rights and duration. The supplied source is preserved; full law-by-law verification remains open.

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What we found in Congress

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